Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 4 Summer 2012

Article 4

April 2013

Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How
Violent Crime Does Not Drive California
Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It
Should
W. David Ball

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
W. D. Ball, Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why
It Should, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not

TOUGH ON CRIME (ON THE STATE’S DIME):
HOW VIOLENT CRIME DOES NOT DRIVE
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ INCARCERATION
RATES—AND WHY IT SHOULD
W. David Ball*
Abstract
California’s prisons are dangerously and unconstitutionally
overcrowded; as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, the state must act to reduce its prison
population or face court-ordered prisoner releases. The state’s plans
to reduce overcrowding are centered around what it calls criminal
justice “realignment,” whereby California will divert some sentenced
offenders away from state facilities towards county facilities. The
plan faces opposition from county officials, who argue that the state
is pushing its problem onto the counties.
But what if the counties are actually responsible for state prison
overcrowding? I argue that California’s prison overcrowding is due
in large part to county decisions about how to deal with crime. Using
data from 2000-2009, I show that California’s counties use state
prison resources at dramatically different rates, and, moreover, that
the counties which use state prisons the most have below-average
crime rates. Viewed this way, the state is simply returning the
problem to its source and forcing counties to pay for their criminal
justice policies.
*
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The contribution this Article makes, then, is twofold. First, it
suggests that incarceration in state prisons is one policy choice
among many, not an inexorable reaction to violent crime. Counties
can and do make different choices about how to respond to violent
crime, including the extent to which they use state prisons. Second,
this Article demonstrates why localities are crucial—and critically
underexamined—contributors to state prison populations. Decisions
are made at local levels about prosecution, investigation, plea
bargaining, and sentencing, and these decisions are made by officials
who are either elected locally (DAs, judges, and sheriffs) or
appointed locally (police and probation officers). Local policies and
policymakers affect the state’s corrections budget, even though the
state has no say in designing or implementing these policies. State
officials must take these local differences into account, and create
incentives for counties to behave differently.
The problem is that it is difficult to distinguish between justifiable,
crime-driven
incarceration
and
optional,
policy-driven
incarceration. I propose a new metric for distinguishing between
these two types of incarceration, one which defines justified
incarceration in terms of violent crime. This would allow the state to
manage local usage of state prison resources without either
penalizing crime-ridden areas or rewarding prison-happy ones.
This Article is the first of two articles dealing with the state/county
prison relationship. While this Article quantifies the ways in which
the extent of local prison admissions is not necessarily a function of
the violent crime rate, a second Article will examine whether, given
these differences, it makes sense for the state to subsidize county
commitments to prison.
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INTRODUCTION
California’s prisons are dangerously and unconstitutionally
overcrowded.1 The state must find a way to cut its prison population
by tens of thousands of prisoners or federal courts will force
California to release them.2 The state has long conceded that the
conditions in its prisons violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment,3 but it has struggled to find ways to
sufficiently reduce overcrowding.4 Last year, the state passed AB
109, a bill which radically reconfigured the relationship between
local governments and the state prison system.5 AB 109, Criminal
Justice Alignment, shifted many sentences from the state level to the
county level.6 Local reaction to the plan has been mixed. Localities
want to control the design and implementation of criminal justice
policies, but they do not want to foot the bill.7 Some members of the
California assembly opposed to AB 109 see the overcrowding
problem as a failure of state leadership and fear that realignment will
result in threats to public safety.8
1. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
2. Id. (“[A]bsent compliance through new construction, out-of-state transfers, or other means . . .
the State will be required to release some number of prisoners before their full sentences have been
served.”).
3. Id. at 1926.
4. Id. at 1927–28. I note that the state reduced its prison population by 9,000 during the pendency
of its appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1923.
5. AB 109, 2011–2012 State Legis., (Cal. 2011). Because the bill changes so many individual
statutes, I have also cited to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest. COMM. ON BUDGET, LEGIS. COUNSEL’S
DIGEST, AB 109 (2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_01010150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html.
6. The default punishment for felonies is now 16 months or 2–3 years in county jail; before AB
109, the default punishment was 16 months or 2–3 years in state prison. Id. The bill will also transfer
most of the state’s parole system to the counties. Id.
7. See, e.g., Curt Hagman, Governor’s Plan: Early Release Disguised as Realignment, SAN
BERNARDINO CNTY. SUN, May 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 9126858 (Author, a California
Assemblyman, agrees that localities can do a better job than the state but argues that it will cost his
county (San Bernardino) money.). See also Don Thompson, Calif Law to Shift Inmates Hinges on
Elusive
Funds,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Apr.
5,
2011,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MDHDE01.htm (citing California State Sheriff’s
Association spokesman as saying the program is a “potential disaster” without guaranteed funding).
8. See, e.g., Shannon Grove, Taxpayers and Prisons, DAILY INDEP. (Ridgecrest, Cal.) (June 8,
2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.ridgecrestca.com/opinions/columnists/x1841755204/Guest-CommentaryShannon-Grove-Taxpayers-and-prisons (author is a California Assemblywoman).
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But what if the counties are actually responsible for state prison
overcrowding, and the state is simply returning the problem to the
counties? Local officials, not state officials, control the inflow into
prison, through decisions about which crimes to investigate, whom to
arrest, and whom to prosecute.9 Juries are empanelled locally, and the
judges who preside over the proceedings are elected locally. The only
thing statewide about the prison system is that the state administers it
and pays for it.10 Zimring and Hawkins famously referred to this as
“the corrections free lunch” in their 1991 book, The Scale of
Imprisonment.11
As the state seeks to manage its prison population, then, it must
account for the potential policy distortions the prison subsidy creates.
The difficulty is in distinguishing between incarceration that is, in

9. Local officials arguably have this power only because state legislatures have chosen to
criminalize so much activity that there is, practically speaking, no substantive limit to the number of
charges attaching to each set of criminal behaviors. For the classic treatment of this problem, see
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. J. 505 (2001).
10. In this Article, I am specifically using the word “prison” to mean the state prison system. This is
not the only carceral option available, of course. Counties have jails, where they sentence offenders,
process arrestees, and hold those who can’t make bail until trial.
11. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211 (1991). In
California, county revenues pay for public protection, which includes judicial expenditures (including
trial courts, clerks, the District Attorney, and the Public Defender), police and sheriffs, and detention
and corrections (adult and youth detention, probation). Some counties receive block grants from the
state through a number of different programs, most prominently the Local Public Safety Fund (LPSF)
and the Local Safety and Protection Account (LPSA). The LPSF is funded through a half cent sales tax.
CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 35. Funds are distributed based on counties’ share of total state taxable sales.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30052 (West 2011). The LPSA is funded through the vehicle license fund and, in
turn, directs most of its funds to particular programs dealing with juvenile justice, law enforcement, and
juvenile probation. CAL. STATE ASS’N OF CNTYS., LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING: SUMMARY OF
RECENT STATUTORY CHANGES AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.csac.counties.org/images/users/1/CSAC-CSSA-CPOC%20FAQ_May%2018.pdf. Both the
juvenile justice program and the law enforcement program make their disbursements based on county
population; the juvenile probation program allocations are fixed by statute. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE,
JUDICIAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 2008-09 ANALYSIS D-21–D-26 (2008–2009), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/crimjust_anl08.pdf. Thirty-seven counties also
receive funds of equal amounts through the Small and Rural Sheriffs’ Grants. CAL. GOV’T CODE §
30070 (West 2011).
I note that none of these disbursements is made on the basis of demonstrated financial need, nor is any
disbursement made on the basis of a county’s level of crime. One complicating point: county revenues
themselves come in large part from the state (32.60%) and federal (19.92%) government, meaning that
the division between state and county (and federal government and county) is complex. CAL. STATE
CONTROLLER,
2008-2009
COUNTIES
ANNUAL
REPORT
iii
(2011),
available
at
http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARD-Local/LocRep/counties_reports_0809counties.pdf.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

5

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4

992

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

some sense, justified by crime problems and that which is the result
of local policy choices about how to deal with that crime.
While several studies have explored the relationship between
incarceration and crime, most have focused on the state and national
level.12 No study has focused on the ways in which county
governments contribute to overpopulation in the adult prison system.
An unpublished paper by Tuosto and Peckenpaugh suggested that
policy differences might explain the differences in county
commitments to the California Department of Juvenile Justice.13 A
recent study looked at sentencing models in rural and urban areas of
Nevada.14 There have been several empirical studies examining
county disparities in imposition of the death penalty in Illinois,15
Missouri,16 California,17 and the federal system,18 as well as an
12. Michael Tonry, in his 2004 survey of existing research, considered several possible explanations
for why the U.S. incarcerates at such a high rate relative to other countries, concluding that the high
crime explanation “has virtually no validity.” MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 27 (2004).
Bruce Western comprehensively analyzed the commonly-theorized causes of incarceration, ranging
from politics to state sentencing, but he focused primarily on the state level. BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). Western’s compelling survey of crime and
incarceration examines research involving cities and neighborhoods, but his analysis does not focus on
sub-state political units as political, policy-making entities. Id. at 36. His own comparison of murder and
incarceration rates compares states to one another. Id. at 49. His analysis of politics, state penal laws,
and the role of discretion in sentencing are all focused on the state level. Id. at 59–66.
13. Nicholas Tuosto & Jason Peckenpaugh, CA County Use of DJJ: 1990–2003 (unpublished article)
(on file with author); see also SELENA TEJI & MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
AN ANALYSIS OF DIRECT ADULT CRIMINAL COURT FILING 2003–2009: WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT
OF
PROPOSITION
21?
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/What_has_been_the_effect_of_Prop_21.pdf (noting disparities in the rates at
which California counties filed charges against juveniles in adult court, and examining the fiscal impacts
of the practice).
14. Victoria Springer et al., Felony Sentencing in Rural and Urban Courts: Comparing Formal
Legal and Substantive Political Models in the West (Working Paper Series, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441593.
15. Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations:
Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1301, 1324–41 (2010) (analyzing, inter alia, county disparities in the prosecution of capital cases and
concluding that “the total number of murders during the period and the average annual murder rate do
not correlate with the number of capital prosecutions in the county”).
16. Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen Thaman, Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009).
17. ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH BY GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY
ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (2008), available at
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_by_geography/death_by_geography.p
df.
18. G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85
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excellent theoretical treatment of the county role in death penalty
administration.19 In 2007, the Justice Policy Institute analyzed
disparities in the prosecution of drug offenses among 198 counties
nationwide.20 The California state Offender Information Services
Branch analyzed California counties’ imposition of second and third
strikes under its Three Strikes law, but did so only for a single year
and only for strike-eligible offenses.21 Twenty years after Zimring
and Hawkins wrote that the correctional free lunch required
“empirical and theoretical work which will both complicate and
enrich the public choice model with special reference to decisions
about imprisonment,”22 few studies have been produced. This Article
and the one to follow will try to fill that gap.
California is a massive state, with more than one tenth of the
country’s population.23 Los Angeles County alone has a population
greater than all but ten states.24 Eight counties besides Los Angeles
have more than a million people,25 a population larger than that of the
smallest seven states. California’s prison population is,
WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (2010) (finding that “the geography of the federal death penalty is anything but
uniform. Six of the ninety-four federal judicial districts account for one-third of death-authorizations”).
19. Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role
in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010).
20. PHILLIP BEATTY ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE VORTEX: THE CONCENTRATED RACIAL
IMPACT OF DRUG IMPRISONMENT AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUNITIVE COUNTIES 3 (2007),
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-12_REP_Vortex_AC-DP.pdf (finding that
“it has become apparent that local policies shape the day-to-day identification of drug users and their
entry into the criminal justice system”).
21. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER FELONS IN THE
ADULT
INSTITUTION
POPULATION
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Quarterly/Strike1/S
TRIKE1d0806.pdf.
22. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 215.
23. U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States (2010), available
at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rank01.html) (listing California’s population as
36,961,664 out of a national population of 307,006,550).
24. Id. The California Department of Finance estimated that Los Angeles County’s 2010 population
was 9, 827, 070. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., E-2. CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES AND
COMPONENTS OF CHANGE BY YEAR—JULY 1, 2000–2010 (2010) [hereinafter E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY
POPULATION
ESTIMATES],
available
at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-2/2000-10/view.php
(follow
hyperlink).
25. In alphabetical order: Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino,
San Diego, and Santa Clara. See E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra note 24
(showing that Montana is 44th with a population of 979,989).
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correspondingly, nearly the same size as the federal system’s prison
population. California is, therefore, a good place to start the analysis
of the counties’ role in state prison overpopulation: the scale of
California’s prisons—as well as the scale of its overcrowding—is of
national import.
California can be thought of not only as a single state, but also as a
collection of fifty-eight counties. Counties are significant political
entities in their own right, distinct from the state. Residents run their
counties: there is no statewide politicking in local elections for
Sheriff, District Attorney, county council, or judge. A California
voter in one county has no say in how another county makes its
criminal justice decisions.
The pair of Alameda and San Bernardino Counties presents
perhaps the starkest example of how local decisions can affect
counties’ usage of state prison resources. A ten-year average of
county data (2000–2009) shown on the chart below indicates that
both counties have similarly-sized populations, similar amounts of
reported violent crime (criminal homicide, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault), similar amounts of reported property crime
(burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny-theft over $400), and
similar amounts of all reported “Part I” crime (all of the above crimes
plus larceny-theft under $400 and arson).26 Overall crime rates are
nearly identical: Alameda is a little more violent and San Bernardino
is a little worse for property crime. Both counties are part of the same
state, governed by the same penal code and state judicial system, yet
ten-year averages of prison usage for that time show two radically
different outcomes: San Bernardino’s prison population was more
than twice as high, on average, as Alameda’s, and it sent an average
of more than three times as many “new felons” to prison each year.

26. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program divides crimes into Part I and Part II. Part I crimes
include criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary (breaking and entering), larcenytheft not of a motor vehicle, motor vehicle theft, and arson. UCR Offense Definitions, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING STATISTICS, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). These
offenses were chosen “because they are serious crimes, they occur with regularity in all areas of the
country, and they are likely to be reported to police.” Id.
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Table 1: Crime Comparison Between San Bernardino and
Alameda Counties, Average Yearly Values 2000-2009

San
Alameda
Bernardino

Ratio of San
Bernardino to
Alameda

Total Population

1,923,360

1,506,740

1.28

Reported Violent
Crime

9,956.6

10,629

.94

Reported
38,762
36,072
Property Crime
All Reported
72,454
74,194
Part I Crime
Yearly Prison
11,441
4,555
Population
Yearly New
3,792
1,088
Felon
Admissions
All figures are ten-year averages, 2000-2009.27

1.07
.98
2.51
3.49

The results of this comparison on a year-to-year basis are shown
graphically in Figure 1. The yearly data was calculated as a ratio (San
Bernardino to Alameda). As in the chart above, a ratio of one means
the counties have equal numbers for that particular category, a ratio
above one indicates the degree to which San Bernardino’s numbers
exceed Alameda’s, and a ratio below one indicates the degree to
which San Bernardino’s numbers are lower than Alameda’s. The
27. The data for this chart, and all charts and tables in this Article, has been posted online at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162. The hyperlink marked “READ ME FIRST.doc”
contains a guide to every chart, table, and graph in this Article. The data from this table in particular
comes from W. DAVID BALL, TOUGH CHART DATA MARCH 2012 REVISED (2012) [hereinafter TOUGH
CHART DATA], available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow Tough Chart Data
March 2012 Revised.xls hyperlink) (tab “All Data 10y avg as #s”); the ratio was calculated in W. DAVID
BALL, COUNTY COMPARISONS (2012) [hereinafter COUNTY COMPARISONS], available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow County Comparisons.xls hyperlink) (tab “SB
Alameda Pct”).
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chart clearly demonstrates that the year-to-year story is no different
than the one told by the ten-year average. During all ten years, San
Bernardino had at least twice the prison population and more than
twice the number of new felon admissions—sometimes many
more—and it did so without suffering from any more crime than
Alameda.
Figure 1: San Bernardino and Alameda Crime Rates and Prison Usage

5.00

4.50

San Bernardino As Multiple of Alameda

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total Population

Violent Crimes Total

Property Crimes Total

Part I Crimes Total

Prison Population

New Felon Admissions

Year

These two counties, then, are almost identical in material ways
when it comes to crime, but they are incredibly different when it
comes to usage of state prison resources. For new felon admissions
alone, San Bernardino costs the state, on average, $93,045,566 more
each year than Alameda; its total prison population costs the state, on
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average, an extra $236,761,677 each year.28 Referencing reported
crime rates cannot explain this difference. The state is paying for San
Bernardino’s decision to treat crime with prison, but Alameda—
indeed, any California citizen who does not live in San Bernardino—
has no say in electing the people who design San Bernardino’s
criminal justice policies. Why should the state pay for a decision only
some of its citizens make, when residents of other counties make
different decisions? In other words, is realignment a sign that the
correctional free lunch is over?
The most persuasive justification for the use of prison is that it is a
response to crime; this paper primarily addresses that argument. For
purposes of this analysis it is assumed that crime rates are exogenous:
that is, counties do not (or cannot) breed crime through policy. This
Article takes no position on whether this is necessarily the case; it is
assumed merely to limit the scope of this Article, and to take the
“prison as a necessary response to crime” argument at its strongest.29
This Article makes no claim that prison should not be used to treat
crime. The focus of the study is to show that violent crime rates alone
cannot explain the observed difference in prison usage among
counties. This Article specifically focuses on violent crimes because
all the dominant justifications for imprisonment—incapacitation,
retribution, and deterrence—consider violent crimes to be the most
worthy of incapacitation, the most deserving of punishment, and the
most serious offenses to be deterred.30
This analysis starts with the proposition that the average of a state
as large as California—with a single county larger than all but nine
states31—smooths over very real differences, much like taking the per
capita average income in a room with Bill Gates would also be
misleading. While the study examines data at the statewide level, the
bulk of the analysis is focused at the county level. This analysis
28. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27.
29. For the argument that prison is criminogenic, see, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Foreword:
Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 240–41 (2009).
30. This Article does not address drug crimes, except briefly in Part III.B., infra, for one main
reason: there are no reported drug crimes and no reported drug crime statistics. The simple fact is that
people who buy, sell, grow, make, possess, and use drugs typically do not report these activities to law
enforcement, and thus they are not reflected in reported crime statistics.
31. Supra note 24.
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shows that San Bernardino and Alameda are not anomalous: the state
as a whole is divided between counties which persistently use prison
resources at high rates and those which use prison at low rates. The
counties with the highest rate of prison usage, have, as a whole,
below-average violent crime rates. They also have lower property
and “Part I” crime rates. The argument that prison usage is driven by
violent crime rates has no statistical support.
A. The Coverage Model
This Article makes one normative proposal: that violent crime
rates should be driving the state’s willingness to pay for localities’
prison commitments. This Article divides the state’s counties into
four segments based on the relationship, within each county, of
reported violent crime and the number of new felons it sends to
prison. A new variable is defined to measure this relationship: the
violent crime coverage rate (“coverage”).32 Coverage is the amount
of new felon admissions (NFA)33 for a given county in a given year
as a percentage of reported violent crime34 for that county in the same
year. Mathematically,
Coveragecountyyear = NFAcountyyear /(Violent Crimecountyyear).

A county with 100 reported violent crimes and 50 NFA would
have a coverage rate of 50%. A county with 500 reported violent
crimes and 50 NFA would have a coverage rate of 10%. Higher
numbers indicate more carceral responses: for a given level of violent
crime, a county with higher coverage sends a larger number of new
32. This measurement has sometimes been called the “effective incarceration rate,” but because this
variable raises key questions about what is (or is not) an effective use of prison, I will use the term
coverage instead.
33. NFA measures prison admissions of individuals convicted of a new crime, as opposed to those
returning to prison on either a “technical” parole violation (e.g. failed drug test) or a new crime charged
as a parole violation. (That is, a crime that could have been charged by a DA—and thus reflected in
NFA statistics—might instead be processed as a parole violation, returning the parolee to prison.) NFA
describes new terms for new offenses; they do, of course, include recidivist prisoners who have been
previously incarcerated.
34. Reported violent crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
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offenders to prison. Counties with lower numbers “cover” their
violent crimes with fewer NFA.35 Some variance might be explained
by the types of violent crime—more murders, for example. This
Article will explore whether this is the case.36
The coverage variable is used to evaluate the number of NFAs a
county sends to state prison. Coverage is used to distinguish between
the crime justified (or necessary) NFA and the non-justified (or
surplus) NFA. In the above example, both counties have identical
numbers of NFA, but the crime underlying those NFA numbers is
five times greater in one county. Merely comparing NFA numbers
would leave out a critical dimension of the analysis. This Article uses
the statewide coverage rate as a baseline. Necessary incarceration is
defined as violent crime in a county times the statewide coverage
rate. That is, the state average is the “fair” amount of incarceration
justified by a particular amount of violent crime; anything above the
state average constitutes a local policy choice that is being subsidized
with state funds. This is obviously a normative choice, but it aligns
with the thrust of this Article’s argument: the rest of the state should
not subsidize a county’s deviation from state policies. If a county
makes different choices from the state as a whole, it should bear the
cost of those policies (and reap the benefits). It is also consonant with
California’s realignment plan, which reserves state prison sentences
for violent offenders, serious offenders, or sex offenders.37
The statewide coverage rate, then, is a proxy for the amount of
incarceration dictated by violent crime itself, not a county’s unique
35. A number of factors might explain coverage rates: higher clearance rates (more efficient law
enforcement), more aggressive policing strategies (e.g. broken windows), or something to do with the
seriousness of the particular offenses (e.g., those facts deserving of more serious punishment). See infra
Part III.
36. My preliminary conclusion is that rates of each type of violent crime are lower in counties which
use a lot of prison resources and, moreover, that the more serious crimes—such as homicide—have too
few cases to account for much of a difference. See infra Part I.B. I also examine the offender mix of
county NFA. See infra Part III.A.
37. See
AB
109,
2011–2012
State
Legis.,
(Cal.
2011),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html
(“The bill provides exceptions to imprisonment in county jail for a variety of felonies, including serious
felonies and violent felonies, as defined, felonies requiring registration as a sex offender, and when the
defendant has a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, or a felony subjecting the defendant to
registration as a sex offender, among other exceptions.”)
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response to violent crime. Calculating the number of surplus NFA in
this way more closely ties prison usage to the justification for that
usage, and differentiates between counties which have to use a lot of
prison and those which choose to use a lot of prison.
The surplus NFA numbers were calculated as follows. The state’s
coverage rate for a given year was multiplied by the number of
reported violent crimes in each county that year to determine the
“crime justified” NFA. These “crime justified” NFA numbers were
subtracted from a county’s actual NFA numbers to arrive at that
county’s NFA surplus (or deficit). As an example, consider a county
with 100 reported violent crimes and 25 NFA during a year when the
state coverage rate was ten percent. The justified NFA figure for the
county would be 10 (100 x .1) and the surplus NFA figure would be
15 (25 minus 10). To calculate the dollar amount of the subsidy, this
surplus (or deficit) NFA figure was multiplied by that year’s per
capita prisoner cost. Mathematically,
Subsidycountyyear = (GrossNFAcountyyear – (Coveragestateyear * Violent
Crimecountyyear)) * Per Capita Prison Coststateyear

I again emphasize that subsidy dollar amounts are not a measure of
the total cost of prison.38 This estimate only calculates the cost for the
first year of imprisonment for surplus NFA. Sentence lengths are
undoubtedly an immense factor in determining the total cost of a
county’s use of state prisons. That is, a county with a below-coverage
NFA number might nevertheless have higher costs because their
felons stay in prison longer. (Of course, it could also be that counties
with higher NFA rates also give longer sentences, in which case the
subsidy numbers will be underweighted relative to the ultimate fiscal
cost.) Nevertheless, I believe that the cost of NFA provides us with a
useful entry point to see which counties benefit from prison subsidies
38. We can easily get that number by multiplying the total numbers of prisoners from a given county
by that year’s cost per prisoner. That number, however, treats all prison commitments as desirable, or at
least undifferentiated. Using coverage to calculate subsidies, however, accounts for the best reason for
incarceration—violent crime. Incarceration at the statewide coverage rate is justified; anything else is
surplus.
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and which counties are taxed by them. I discuss the implications of
sentence lengths infra at Part IVB.
This Article focuses on NFA, not total prison population, for
simplicity. Stephen Raphael and Michael Stoll have modeled prison
population as a function of admission rates, release rates, and the
prison population the year before.39 This Article focuses on
admissions rates alone because it seeks to differentiate between
crime-justified incarceration and policy-driven incarceration.
Sentence length, which affects time to release, invariably involves
case-specific factors which do not lend themselves to systematic
analysis. It is difficult enough to determine what constitutes a “real
offense;” it is that much more difficult to determine the “real”
sentence length of a given offense, as the U.S. Sentencing
Commission has so often demonstrated.
NFA, instead, simply measures who enters prison from a given
county, not how long they stay there. Its simplicity is not without its
costs, however. It is, of course, possible that Low Use counties are
sending offenders to prison for longer sentences than High Use
counties, and therefore their prison usage is greater over the long
term. If that is the case, the method chosen in this Article will not
account for that. I revisit this question with additional data infra at
Part IIA and Part IVB, where I look at the actual percentages of
offense types in each county’s NFA and how long they are sentenced,
respectively, and conclude that this is not the case. I also note that
total prison population for Low Use counties is consistently much
lower than that of High Use counties, suggesting that the “time to
release” variable noted by Stoll and Raphael is not operative, at least
in the ten years of data examined in this Article.

39. Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in DO PRISONS
MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 6 (Steven Raphael & Michael A.
Stoll
eds.,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/why_are_so_many_americans_in_prison.pdf. Raphael and Stoll
conclude that the increase in population is not primarily due to increases in crime, characterizing the rise
in incarceration as a policy experiment. Id. at 65.
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B. Why Coverage Matters
If the violent crime to NFA relationship is not predictive at the
state level, this raises two obvious questions: what might explain it,
and why does this even matter? As to the first question, this Article
considers a variety of explanations: other crimes, local law
enforcement, politics, per capita income, and the use and type of incounty dispositions. The exploration of these subjects is, for space
reasons, tentative, but the dataset is posted online and others are
encouraged to do additional analysis.40
There are three ways in which this analysis makes potentially
significant contributions. First, there are very real fiscal impacts to
counties’ usage of prison, ones that are not transparent enough in the
present system. By controlling for the influence of violent crime, the
estimation of fiscal impact is a closer representation of differences in
policy among counties, policy choices which are subsidized by the
unwilling residents of other counties. This Article is part of a twopart series that examines why states should subsidize state prisons
when local officials decide who is sent there.41 This Article will, it is
hoped, dispel the idea that the level of prison usage in California is a
necessary result of violent crime.
Using the coverage rate model of prison subsidy, this Article will
demonstrate that some individual counties that make different policy
choices—choices not dictated by the average response to violent
crime—cost the state tens of millions of dollars a year, every year,
while others leave tens of millions of dollars of prison resources on
the table. This Article also explores what would happen if the entire
state incarcerated at the coverage rate of the most carceral counties.
This raises a key question: if one county or set of counties is entitled
to incarcerate at a given rate, why shouldn’t other counties do so as
well? And if the state can only afford to have some counties
incarcerating greater numbers of people per violent crime, which
40. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. (The hyperlink marked “READ ME FIRST.doc”
contains a guide to every chart, table, and graph in this Article.).
41. See also W. David Ball, Why Should States Pay For Prisons, When Local Officials Decide Who
Goes
There?
(Working
Paper
Series,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871274.
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ones get to do so, and on what basis? Ultimately, this analysis sheds
light on how—or whether—residents of under-incarcerating counties
can rein in over-incarcerating counties in the present system, given
that all citizens pay for prison equally through general state revenues,
regardless of how heavily their counties use prison.
The second point is that state prison problems are not necessarily
best addressed by statewide solutions. As this Article demonstrates,
counties operating under the same set of laws and in the same court
system get widely different results. Statewide solutions—such as
changes to statutes, sentencing commissions, and the like—are
almost always proposed as the means of addressing state prison
overpopulation. But, because they fail to address the differences in
local enforcement, they cannot effectively address the problem. In
other words, because they are based on an inaccurate or incomplete
diagnosis of the cause of state prison usage, these solutions cannot
cure the disease.42
Third, this analysis has important ramifications for the state’s
implementation of criminal justice realignment. The question of how
much incarceration counties will be expected to deal with inside the
county depends crucially on how California sets the baseline rate of
each county’s use of state resources. The current plan is to set the
baseline at current levels of prison usage. This would be a mistake, in
my view, because it would make permanent the state subsidies of
what appear to be policy choices. Just because a county has been
using state prisons at a given rate does not mean that it had to. I
propose, instead, that the state base prison usage on reported violent
crime rates and the statewide violent-crime-to-new-felon-admission
coverage rate. This would tie funding to need, rather than funding to
use.
***
42. Franklin Zimring, in a recent article, observes that the huge growth in prison population during
the 1970s and 1980s was not accompanied by any significant changes in state penal codes. Because of
the discretion in the American system, however, “substantial changes in aggregate punishment policy
can take place without any substantial change in the legislation governing the levels of punishment
available or the choice of punishments in individual cases.” Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of
Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1232 (2010).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the sources and
methods used for this Article. Part II examines the relationship
between crime and incarceration. Part III explores other possible
explanations for differences in county commitments to state prisons.
Part IV lays out the fiscal implications of differences in incarceration
rates, demonstrating that counties which incarcerate at a relatively
greater rate are doing so at great cost to the state: that is, they are
tough on crime on the state’s dime. This Article concludes with a
discussion of potential policy implications this analysis has for the
future of California criminal justice reform.
I. SOURCES, LIMITATIONS, AND METHODS OF THE STUDY
This Section provides a brief outline of how this study was
conducted. I begin by describing the data sources used in this Article,
all of which are made available online by the state. I then discuss
some limitations with this study that might explain the results. I then
discuss further the ways in which I subdivided the state on the basis
of violent crime coverage rates and the calculated prison subsidy.
A. Sources
The state of California maintains several public databases available
on the internet; it also publishes annual reports on the offender
population incarcerated in the state’s prison. The data I used in this
analysis came from these sources and dates from 2000 to 2009. All
data has been compiled into a single spreadsheet which I have made
available online.43 In this section, I will discuss sources for particular
data, as well as changes to the data I made, where necessary to
account for things such as the difference between calendar year and
fiscal year reporting.
County population. The California Department of Justice uses
estimates from the State Department of Finance to generate three
potentially useful county population figures, divided by age: Total
43. See generally http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162.
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Population at Risk, (ages 10-69), Adult Population at Risk (ages 1869), and Juvenile Population at Risk (ages 10-17).44 I have used the
Adult Population at Risk (APAR) figures throughout this Article and
have calculated crime, arrest, and new felon admission rates using
raw numbers and dividing by these population figures, normalizing
per 100,000.45 I did so to avoid rate differences that might stem from
using different population figures. The California Department of
Finance estimates the total adult population for each county as of
July 1 of each year.46 I have used total population figures to contrast
with Adult Population at Risk only where noted. These figures do not
include relevant information about population distribution—e.g.,
degree of urbanization—that might be relevant drivers of crime
and/or carceral responses, nor do they include figures about racial or
ethnic subpopulations within a given county, which might also be

44. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES,
2000: BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2000), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/27.pdf. The
term “at Risk” presumably refers to those people who are at greatest risk of becoming involved with the
criminal justice system, either as juveniles or adults, but the figure counts all residents of a county in
that age group.
45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS BY CITY AND
COUNTY: CSJC TABLES (2000), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/datatabs.php. Individual population
reports are also available. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POPULATION
ESTIMATES,
2009
BY
COUNTY
tbl.27
(2009),
available
at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2008 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2008), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof08/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2007 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2007), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof07/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2006 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2006), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof06/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2005 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2005), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2004 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2004), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof04/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2003 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2003), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2002 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2002), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof02/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2001 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2001), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof01/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2000 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2000), available at
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/27.pdf.
46. See E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra note 24.
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relevant. Department of Finance figures do, however, account for
both legal residents and “unauthorized foreign immigrants.”47
Prison Population by County, New Felon Admissions by
County, and Parole Violators with a New Term by County. The
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation publishes
annual population reports on prisoners housed in state prisons. Each
year, the state publishes the total population of prisoners by county of
commitment as of December 31 of that year,48 as well as yearly totals
by county for new felon admissions and parole revocations.49 I note
47. Id.
48. California Prisoners & Parolees Report Archive, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPrisArch
ive.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (follow hyperlinks for individuals years between 2000 and 2009).
2002 and 2001 reports contained data from the year prior; reports after 2004 contained data from that
year. In 2003, the Data Analysis Unit combined two years’ worth of data into one report. DATA
ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 2009 tbl.10
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2009.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2008
tbl.10
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2008.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2007
tbl.10
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2007.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2006
tbl.10
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2006.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2005
tbl.10
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2005.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2004
tbl.10
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2004.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2003
34
tbl.10,
139
tbl.10
(2003),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2003.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2002
tbl.10
(2002),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2002.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS &
PAROLEES
2001
tbl.10
(2001),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2001.pdf.
49. See California Prisoners & Parolees Report Archive, supra note 48, at tbl.5A (for the years 2000
and 2002–06); Id. at tbl.15A (for the years 2007–09). 2000 data is in the 2001 report. 2002 data is in the
2002 report. The 2003 report provides 2003 data in the second set of tables. Id. at 128 tbl.5A. Thereafter
the data for a given year is in that year’s report. 2001 data was not given in any of the annual reports. It
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that this population figure is taken in a different month (December)
than the county population figures noted above (July) and that prison
figures represent actual headcounts, while county population figures
are estimated.
Crime and Arrest Figures; Probation and Jail Figures. I used
Department of Justice published data for reported crimes,50 felony
arrests,51 adult probation caseload,52 and jail population figures.53 As
noted earlier, I chose to calculate rates per 100,000 APAR myself,
was, instead, taken from Characteristics Of Felon New Admissions And Parole Violators Returned With
A New Term: Calendar Year 2001. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR., CHARACTERISTICS OF
FELON NEW ADMISSIONS AND PAROLE VIOLATORS RETURNED WITH A NEW TERM: CALENDAR YEAR
2001
tbl.11,
tbl.16
(2002),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/ACHAR1/A
CHAR1d2001.pdf. The figures from Tables 11 and 16 were added to arrive at total new admissions
figures (calculated).
50. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county crimes data, see Statistics:
Crimes, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/CrimeCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data
may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county).
51. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county arrests data, see Statistics:
Felony Arrests, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ArrestCoFel.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county
data may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county).
52. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s adult probation data, see Statistics:
Supervision, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/SuperCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data
may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). The data is incomplete: Contra Costa,
Merced, Sacramento, Siskiyou, Tulare, and Yolo counties did not report separate misdemeanor
population counts. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
TREND DATA FOOTNOTES (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf.
Mariposa County reported -47 people on the misdemeanor probation caseload for 2000, so I deleted all
data from that year; the same is true for San Joaquin County for 2002, which reported a felony probation
caseload of -423. See Statistics: Supervision, 1999–2009, supra (follow hyperlinks for Mariposa County
and San Joaquin County). Gaps in the data also crop up intermittently and are a result of no data being
reported; they should not be read as zeroes.
53. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s jail population data, see
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/index.htm
(2009),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof08/index.htm
(2008),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof07/index.htm
(2007),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof06/index.htm
(2006),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/index.htm
(2005),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof04/index.htm
(2004),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof03/index.htm
(2003),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof02/index.htm
(2002),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof01/index.htm
(2001),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/index.htm (2000) (individual county data may be accessed by
following hyperlinks; select county name and table 8, jail profile survey). Total figures might not add up
due to projections and rounding of numbers. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52.
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rather than rely on the state’s rates, to avoid differentials based solely
on different numbers (or definitions) of population. I use crime and
arrest figures for two reasons. First, arrest figures can serve as a
proxy for how active and/or effective law enforcement in a particular
locale is (through the use of community policing, etc.). I examined
county clearance rates as well to determine how effective a given
county was at solving crimes.54 Second, because there are no reported
drug crime statistics, drug arrests serve as a proxy for drug crimes,
albeit an imperfect one, since they conflate policing resources,
strategies, and priorities with the level of underlying activity.
This data is subject to a number of limitations.55 If multiple crimes
take place, only the most serious is recorded.56 The same is true when
an offender is arrested for multiple offenses.57 Crime is generally
seen to be subject to reporting variations: a particular county might
have actual crime rates that are a greater or lesser percentage of
reported crimes. The state collects information on dispositions;
however, this data is marred by a very large “other” category and the
state cautions that dispositions “data may or may not be
representative at the county level.”58 Accordingly, I have focused
only on county jail and probation figures. Within the jail data, I have
ignored data on Type I facilities, which are used only for detentions
of up to 96 hours, not sentencing; I have, instead, used figures for
Type II, III, and IV facilities59 because they can be used to sentence
54. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county clearance data, see
Statistics: Crimes, 2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ClearanceCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county
data may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). I calculated clearance rates using the
number of cleared cases.
55. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA CHARACTERISTICS
AND KNOWN LIMITATIONS (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/limits.pdf. See
also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TREND DATA
FOOTNOTES (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf.
56. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 55, at 1.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 2–3.
59. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1006 (2012). “Type II facility” means a local detention facility used
for the detention of persons pending arraignment, during trial, and upon a sentence of commitment. Id.
“Type III facility” means a local detention facility used only for the detention of convicted and
sentenced persons. Id. “Type IV facility” means a local detention facility or portion thereof designated
for the housing of inmates eligible under Penal Code Section 1208 for work/education furlough and/or
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offenders. These figures are taken from actual population reports and
are divided between sentenced and non-sentenced prisoners. Nonsentenced prisoners are those who are denied bail, unable to make
bail, or in some form of temporary detention.
Cost per Prisoner. I calculated the cost per prisoner by using
corrections budget figures60 and dividing by the prison population.
This is a crude approximation of the cost per prisoner since there are
certain fixed costs in the state prison system that are not fully realized
on a marginal basis and because some of the funds go to the
Department of Juvenile Justice. However, this is the same method the
Bureau of Justice Statistics has used in its State Prison Expenditures
series.61 Again, because the state’s fiscal year goes from July 1 to
June 30, I averaged two years together in order to get approximations

other programs involving inmate access into the community. Id.
60. See California Budget Historical Documents, 2012–13, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (for Final Budget Summaries, select
year from drop down menu). For budget figures for 2000–2001, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2000–01 FINAL
BUDGET SUMMARY 48 (2001), available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/
GovernorsBudget/pdf/2000-01budsum.pdf. For budget figures for 2001–2002, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
2001–02
FINAL
BUDGET
SUMMARY
(2002),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/2001-02budsum.pdf. For budget figures
for 2002–2003, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2002–03 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 384 (2003), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/
GovernorsBudget/pdf/2002-03budsum.pdf. For budget figures for 2003–2004, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
2003–04
FINAL
BUDGET
SUMMARY
2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/2003-04budsum.pdf. For budget figures
for 2004–2005, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2004–05 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 6 (2005), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/
GovernorsBudget04/pdf/fbudsum_04.pdf. For budget figures for 2005–2006, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
2005–06
FINAL
BUDGET
SUMMARY
11
(2006),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget05/pdf/fbudsum_05.pdf. For budget reports for
2006–2007, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2006–07 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 400 (2007), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/
GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_06.pdf. For budget figures for 2007–2008, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
2007–08
FINAL
BUDGET
SUMMARY
14
(2008),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_07.pdf. For budget figures for
2008–2009, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2008–09 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 18 (2009), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/
GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_0809.pdf. For budget figures for 2009–2010, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN.,
2009–10
FINAL
BUDGET
SUMMARY
7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_09.pdf.
61. See, e.g., JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf.
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of calendar year figures—with the exception of 2000, for which I
simply used 2000–2001 figures.
My calculations are actually lower than the estimates published by
the state Legislative Analyst’s Office (L.A.O), which estimated that
the cost of incarcerating each prisoner in California in 2008–2009
was $47,102.62 My estimate for the calendar year 2008 was
$41,200.05. Because the L.A.O has not released estimates for all the
years in my survey, however, I decided to use calculated figures. If
anything, this indicates that the subsidy the state pays to counties that
are heavy users of the state prison system—and the corresponding tax
on those counties that do not use it as heavily—might be greater than
the figures used in this Article.
B. Limitations of the Study
The main difficulty with this study is deciding what proxy to use
for the “fair” rate of prison usage to which a county is rightfully
entitled. I make no normative claim about how a county should use
prisons, nor have I found a statistical one.63 There is no consensus on
this in California, academia, or elsewhere. In fact, that is the point of
this series of articles: given this lack of consensus, residents of a
particular county should not have to pay for the policy choices of
residents of another county. High coverage rates are not necessarily
bad, nor are low ones good. My point is only that if there is no
consensus, high rates should not be subsidized, nor low rates
penalized. In other words, while I make no claims about high usage

62. See California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYSTS’
OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections
/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012); see also CAL. STATE AUDITOR,
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION: IT FAILS TO TRACK AND USE DATA
THAT WOULD ALLOW IT TO MORE EFFECTIVELY MONITOR AND MANAGE ITS OPERATIONS 26 (2009),
available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.1.pdf (estimating an annual cost per inmate in
2007–2008 of $49,300).
63. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, I believe that normative questions cannot be avoided even in
a heavily quantified context. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 395, 397 (2011) (questioning whether parole release is “inherently about risk or inherently
about desert, or whether it is irreducibly about both”).
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itself, I do claim that the state’s prison resources should not be
distributed on a first-come, first-served basis.64
While using violent crime rates is a crude measure of the need for
prison, I do not believe there is a “real offense” alternative. That is,
there is no way to readily look at a given criminal case or set of
criminal cases and determine which ones should result in a prison
sentence and which ones should not. There are a number of
complicating factors. The first is plea bargaining. Charged offenses
are an inaccurate measure of the real offense because a DA might
overcharge for strategic reasons in order to posture during plea or
charge bargaining. Offenses might also be undercharged as the result
of such bargaining. The second complicating factor is evidentiary.
The strength of an individual case has as much to do with evidentiary
concerns as with the heinousness of the underlying conduct. A case
with bad facts might nevertheless get a lower sentence due to a lack
of witnesses or a lack of high-quality witnesses (for example, if the
available witnesses can be impeached due to prior criminal offenses).
Evidence might be excluded due to violations of the Fourth
Amendment, or confessions might be invalidated due to violations of
the Fifth Amendment. A third issue has to do with what the
defendant might be able to offer in a different case. Individuals with
valuable testimony to offer can exchange that testimony for reduced
sentences even if they’re caught red-handed. This, again, has nothing
to do with the real offense conduct at issue. Finally, isolating
aggravating sentencing factors, such as prior offenses, use of a
particular weapon, proximity to schools (in the case of drug dealing),
etc., would be far too complex. I considered using “wobblers”—
California crimes that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors—
64. This might be different were citizens of a state to agree that prison beds should, for example, be
allocated on the basis of risk, but these risk assessments would have to be administered routinely (and
accurately) throughout the criminal justice system. For one argument exploring the fiscal implications of
risk-based allocation of sentencing outcomes, see Michael Connelly, Evidence-Based, Public Safety
Sentences and Fiscal Crisis: Maintaining Public Safety in the Face of Permanent Entrenchment (Jan. 19,
2010) (unpublished article) (on file with author). This Article analyzes survival rates (defined as no
return to Oklahoma prison) of offenders with low, moderate, and high risk profiles sentenced to prison
only, prison and probation, suspended probation, and deferred probation, and finds that prison is most
effective for high risk prisoners and contraindicated for low and moderate risk offenders. Id. at 16–17.
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but could not control for the above variables. If there were a way to
determine whether an offense should have been charged as a felony
or misdemeanor, one could obviously see how it was charged and
determine overuse or underuse of prison accordingly. But asking how
a wobbler should have been charged is, in fact, the question we
cannot answer. The point of this study is not to question the decisions
of individual DAs, judges, or juries in individual cases but to start to
explore the systematic differences that might explain why California
counties use prison at different rates.
I used counties to examine intra-state differences primarily
because there are several county-wide elected officials instrumental
in criminal justice: county citizens elect sheriffs, DAs, and judges;
counties administer probation; cities within counties elect the mayors
who appoint police chiefs; and juries are drawn from within counties.
Perhaps a better way of putting it is that California citizens have no
say in selecting another county’s sheriffs, judges, DAs, or juries.
Counties are thus responsible for the overwhelming proportion of law
enforcement within their borders, the charges that are filed, the trials
that take place, and the jails or probation departments to which
offenders might be sent. California also publishes its crime data by
county.
Nevertheless, I concede that parts of counties can be different from
one another and might have more in common with parts of
neighboring counties than they do with parts of their own counties.65
Counties can be a mix of rural and urban, for example, and this might
bear on the way crime manifests itself. Cities within counties also
drive their own policies, primarily through municipal police
departments. Some counties might have transient populations or be
victimized by criminals who reside in neighboring counties. Even
within a given county agency, different parts of the county might
have different approaches. Different offices of a county DA might

65. For a fuller discussion, see W. David Ball, E Pluribus Unum: Data and Operations Integration
in the California Criminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 294 (2010) (discussing
shortcomings with using the county as the base unit for criminal justice).
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have different sentencing or charging “going rates” for a given crime,
for example, particularly in a county as large as Los Angeles.
I look at rates, not numbers, for a variety of reasons. The primary
reason is the high degree of collinearity between population size and
gross amounts of violent crime and new felon admissions.66 That is,
bigger counties have more crime and more NFAs as a result of
having more people. Population size has nothing to do with NFA
rate, however, and is not a reliable predictor of NFA rates normalized
to 100,000 residents.
Comparing rates within a given year has the additional advantage
of isolating for year-to-year statutory and regulatory changes.
Statutes—albeit not their execution—are uniform across the state for
every given year, but they change from year to year. This study looks
laterally from county to county in a given year, not within a county
across time. Year-to-year NFA rates, for example, would have to
account for changes in the penal code during the period studied.
Proposition 36, for example, was passed in 2000 and went into effect
in 2001, and it allowed for first- and second-time nonviolent drug
offenders to be diverted into treatment in lieu of incarceration.67 This
likely had some year-to-year effect on drug NFA.
I note that my conclusions are only as good as the reported data. I
take no position on how accurate the data is, and I note that the state
has expressed skepticism about particular counties’ data in particular
years.68 I am unaware, however, of any systematic bias in the data. I
note further that for data defects to affect the study in predictable
ways (e.g. overestimating high use counties’ use of the state prison
system), the bias would have to operate for a particular county in a
particular direction on a multi-year basis in order to skew the results.
66. Running a linear regression with gross (non-normalized) amounts of NFA as the dependent
variable and gross (non-normalized) amounts of county population, violent crime, and property crime as
the independent variables, the tolerance levels are between .035 and .105, meaning that 89.5% or more
of the variance of each predictor can be explained by the other predictors. The variance inflation factors
(VIFs) for each are also high, ranging from 9.521 to 28.338. VIFs above 2 are considered problematic.
67. Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, Prop 36 (codified at Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 11999.4–.14 (West 2011); Cal. Penal Code §§ 1210, 3063.1 (West 2012)), available at
http://www.prop36.org/.
68. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 55; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52.
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That is, Alameda would have to over-report crime for ten years and
San Bernardino under-report it for the same duration, for example, in
order to skew my results systematically against high use counties.
Finally, there are the obvious limitations of statistical analysis
itself (and of my abilities). There is more than one way to analyze
data and several tools to do so. My goal in this Article is to dispel the
idea that NFA are the necessary result of crime rates. While I believe
that the data provides potential insights, lack of a statistically
significant correlation does not mean that there is in fact no
correlation given chance variability. The analysis may also be altered
by omitted variables.
C. Methods
This part explains the methods I used to subdivide California into
four groups on the basis of violent crime coverage and the calculated
numbers of surplus NFA: High Use counties, Low Use counties, Los
Angeles County, and Middle Use counties. The terms “High Use,”
“Low Use,” and “Middle Use” are relative, given that there is no
consensus on the “fair” level of incarceration. For my purposes,
“High Use” means a county that appeared in the top quartile more
than seven times in ten years in either coverage rate or surplus
(unjustified) NFA; “Low Use” means a county that appeared the
same number of times in the bottom quartile of these measurements.
As stated earlier, coverage is the ratio of NFA to reported violent
crime, expressed as a percentage. For the purposes of county
classification, I calculated the yearly state average coverage rate for
each of the ten years of the study (2000–2009). I then calculated
yearly coverage rates for each of California’s fifty-eight counties. I
expressed the county coverage rate as a percentage of that year’s state
coverage rate, which gave me a relative measure of how much a
given county’s coverage exceeded or undercut the state rate during
that year. Mathematically, the formula was:
Relative Coverageyear = County Coverageyear /(State Coverageyear)
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This method had the benefit of controlling for year-to-year
statewide differences in crime rate, pinpointing which counties were
relatively more carceral, not which years were. I divided the results
into quartiles. The top quartile contained county coverage rates that
were almost twice as high as that year’s state coverage rate
(199.75%). That is, in those years, these counties sent almost twice as
many people to prison per reported violent crime as the state as a
whole. Two counties appeared in the top quartile all ten years: Kings
and Sutter. Eight more appeared at least seven times: Glenn and
Trinity (both appeared eight of ten years) and Butte, Colusa, Inyo,
Lake, Lassen, and Shasta Counties (appearing seven years). In the
bottom quartile, six counties had coverage rates less than or equal to
88.29% of the state coverage rate in all ten years: Alameda, Contra
Costa, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Cruz. Eight more were
in the bottom quartile at least seven times: Marin (appearing nine
years), Imperial (appearing eight years), and Alpine, Nevada,
Sacramento, San Benito, Sonoma, and Stanislaus (appearing seven
years). I used all ten years of data for any county listed above, even
those with some yearly data not in the top quartile. I did so because
the purpose of this study is to discover whether there is something
inherent in these particular counties, not to explore what might have
happened in anomalous years.69
I then divided the state based on calculated numbers of surplus
NFA. The ultimate focus of this Article is on the use of state prison
resources. Because small counties with high coverage rates
nevertheless consume very little of the state’s ten billion dollar prison
budget, this measure accounted for gross numbers of each county’s
prison usage not justified by violent crime. That is, this variable
measured the size of the problem—how many surplus NFA a given
county was sending to prison each year. As explained above, surplus
NFA was calculated by multiplying a county’s reported violent crime
rate by the state coverage rate for that year, which yields a “crime
justified” number of NFA. This yields the average statewide carceral
69. See infra Appendix A for a complete list of all counties. See also infra Appendix B for a map of
the counties.
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reaction to a particular level of violent crime. I subtracted this
amount from a county’s actual NFA to get the surplus NFA (or, for
negative numbers, the NFA deficit).
As with coverage, I looked at counties that appeared in the top or
bottom quartile more than seven times. Counties appearing in the top
surplus NFA quartile were as follows: Kern, Kings, Orange,
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara appeared all ten years;
Butte, Fresno, Shasta and Sutter were appeared nine out of ten years;
Placer and Santa Barbara appeared seven out of ten years. Counties
in the bottom quartile were as follows: Alameda, Contra Costa,
Sacramento, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Cruz appeared all
ten years; Imperial, Los Angeles, and Marin appeared nine of ten
years; and Nevada, San Diego, Sonoma, and Stanislaus appeared
seven of ten years. I included data from all ten years for each county
in the top and bottom group. San Diego appeared twice in the top
quartile for surplus NFA, which shows that these figures are sensitive
to small changes in coverage for counties with large populations.
Initial analysis revealed that both coverage and surplus top and
bottom quartiles exhibited similar responsiveness to the key variables
in my analysis. I grouped them together in what I call the Low Use
and High Use groups respectively. High Use counties, in other
words, contain counties with high coverage, high surplus NFA, or
both. Low Use counties contain counties with low coverage, NFA
deficits, or both. I will discuss general observations about these
groups in the following section.70
Because Los Angeles is such a large county, I decided to calculate
results for the Low Use group without it, even though Los Angeles
had an NFA deficit in nine of the ten years of the study. Exempting
Los Angeles also ensured that the populations of the High and Low
Use groups would be relatively similar—and relatively similar to that
of Los Angeles—and thus that contrasts between them could be more
readily observed.71
70. See infra Part II.
71. Los Angeles’ average total population from 2000 to 2009 was 10.1 million, and the adult
population at risk for Los Angeles was 6.6 million. The Low Use population was 10.2 million with 6.8
million at risk, and the High Use population was 11.7 million with 7.6 million at risk.
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This leaves twenty five other counties, with a combined average
population of 4.5 million that did not appear more than seven times
in either the top or bottom quartile of either coverage or surplus
NFA. While the bulk of my analysis will focus on the other three
segments of California, I briefly note that this group is
heterogeneous. For example, Merced and Yolo are both members of
this group and have almost identical NFA numbers, and yet Yolo has
less violent crime (and property and Part I crime) than Merced,
giving it a much higher coverage rate. Several counties appeared in
the top coverage quartile more than four times: Modoc and Yuba
(appearing six of ten years); Plumas, Sierra, and Siskiyou (appearing
five of ten years); and Amador, Calaveras, and Tuolomne (appearing
four of ten years). Only one county appeared more than four times in
the bottom quartile: Monterey (appearing five of ten years).
Table 2: Demographics of the Four State Segments, Average
Yearly Values 2000–2009

High
Low Use Los
Middle
State
Use
Angeles
Use
Total
Population
11.74
10.17
10.07
4.53
36.51
(millions)
APAR
7.62
6.81
6.55
3.00
23.98
Population
(millions)
Prison
55,079
37,023
54,187
17,612
164,000
Population
Number
18
14
1
25
58
of
Counties
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on tenyear averages.72

72. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (“ tab “Stats by County Segment”).
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All data was prepared in Excel. I then used Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) to draw histograms and scatterplots, using
linear regression models and linear fit lines. Syntax for my SPSS
work has been posted to the folder with the rest of my data.73
II. VIOLENT CRIME RATES AND NEW FELON ADMISSION RATES
Although violent crime rates and NFA rates are correlated on a
statewide level, reported violent crime does not sufficiently explain
why counties have such disparate NFA rates. Why do counties
respond to violent crime so differently? Throughout this section, I
will use the coverage variable as my proxy variable for a county’s
carceral response to violent crime.
I begin with a discussion of the statewide numbers, and then I
examine High Use counties, Low Use counties, Los Angeles County,
and the rest of the state.
A. The State
In this section, I will first demonstrate that some counties
systematically incarcerate at different rates. I will then look at
whether reported violent crime explains this differential usage at the
statewide level.
First, counties send people to prison at different rates, even
without correcting for crime. Figure 2 plots NFA rates, normalized to
100,000 APAR. The chart looks at all fifty-eight counties for all ten
years of data and counts the number of instances counties reported a
particular NFA rate.

73. W. DAVID BALL, Final Charts syntax (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162
(follow Final Charts syntax with split.sps hyperlink).
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Figure 2: Frequency of NFA Rates/100K APAR, 2000–2009

The shape of the histogram is relatively normal, although high
NFA counties skew the distribution right. If individual counties were
in these ranges an equal amount of time, the distribution would be
normal as well. Certain counties, however, appear consistently in the
top and bottom quartiles. Some counties consistently send people to
prison at greater rates than others.
But NFA only tells part of the story. NFA looks normal when
compared to population. NFA as a function of reported violent crime
presents a more chaotic picture. Figure 3 plots NFA rates and rates of
reported violent crime for all fifty-eight counties and all ten years.
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Figure 3: Violent Crime to NFA (Rates, 100,000 APAR), 2000–
2009

Although the relationship of the Violent Crime Rate per 100,000
APAR is statistically significant at the one percent level, it is not a
significant statistic. The amount of variance it explains is minute
(r^2=.032, which means changes in Violent Crime rates explain 3.2
% of the variance in NFA rates), and the standard error is relatively
large (root mean squared error (RMSE) = 98.50139). What does this
mean? The scatterplot data shows that, although a linear fit line can
be drawn, the data does not cluster around it and the relationship is
barely above zero. In other words, if we were to use violent crime
rates to predict NFA rates at the county level, the amount it would
predict would be very small.
The correlation between crime and NFA might be weak because
county type dominates any effects crime might have. That is, violent
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crime itself does not make a county High or Low Use. However, we
might still see that changes in reported violent crime does, in fact,
predict changes in NFA within county types. For example, more
crime in a Low Use county might result in more NFA, and less crime
in a High Use county might result in fewer NFA. The following chart
shows what happens to the crime-NFA relationship within the state
once counties are divided by county type.
Figure 4: Violent Crime to NFA (Rates, 100,000 APAR), 2000–
2009, By County Type

Here we see that there is a much more robust correlation between
crime and NFA within county type, with an r2 of .243 for Low Use
counties (including Los Angeles) and an r2 of .189 for High Use
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counties (both statistically significant at the 1 percent level).74 This
means that within county types variance in crime explains
approximately twenty percent of variance in NFA. Crucially, we
have also already seen that without dividing the state, variance in
crime only explains roughly three percent of variance in NFA.
County types dominate the effects of crime at the statewide level.
Without subdividing the state by county type, crime explains very
little about NFA. There is no statewide story about “the typical
California response to crime,” just sub-stories within segments of the
state. Violent crime does not make a county High Use or Low Use: it
only operates to change relative usage within those segments.
B. Violent Crime and NFA in the Four State Segments
Crime rates do not explain why some segments have higher NFA
and higher total prison populations than others. High Use counties
have below average crime, and Low Use counties have above
average crime.
I looked at criminal justice statistics for each of the four segments
(High Use, Low Use, Los Angeles, and Middle Use) to see what,
besides levels of state prison usage, distinguishes them in hopes of
shedding light on why each segment uses state prison resources at
such different rates. This analysis is largely descriptive, not
predictive.

74. The data is still relatively scattered, with an RMSE of 51.83820 and 76.20699 for Low and High
Use counties respectively. Middle Use counties, not pictured, have an r^2 of .239, also statistically
significant at the one percent level.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

36

Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not

2012]

TOUGH ON CRIME

1023

Table 3: Crime Rates and Prison Usage, Average Yearly Values,
2000–2009

High
Low
Los
Use
Use
Angeles
622.67
835.94 1,128.27

Middle
State
Use
Average
609.13
819.70

Violent
Crime
Property
2,618.73 3,134.31 2,780.05 2,296.28 2,768.84
Crime
Part I
5243.54 6404.46 5494.90 4881.71 5,596.56
Crime
NFA
223.57
122.04
211.87
167.99
184.58
VC
35.90%
14.60%
18.78% 27.58% 22.52%
Coverage
Rate
Total
723.13
543.63
826.68
586.48
683.36
Prison
Population
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except VC
Coverage Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages
include Los Angeles County.75
California counties that incarcerate the most do not have the
highest violent crime, property crime, or total Part I crime rates in the
state. In fact, all three rates are below the state average. What is
more, both Low Use counties and Los Angeles have higher violent,
property, and Part I crime rates while maintaining lower NFA rates.
Low Use counties’ NFA rates are slightly more than half those of
High Use counties, even though each measure of crime in Low Use
counties is approximately twenty percent higher. The Middle Use
counties have the lowest crime rates in all three categories but still
incarcerate at substantially higher rates than the Low Use counties.

75. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”).
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The chart also demonstrates the importance of choosing what
measure to use to justify incarceration. Los Angeles has a significant
violent crime problem, so according to the method used in this study,
its NFA are justified. In fact, Los Angeles could justify more NFA on
the basis of its reported violent crime rate. Because Los Angeles has
a significant violent crime problem, its coverage rate is half of that of
High Use counties. However, property and Part I crime rates in Los
Angeles County are at the state average. On these alternative
measures of crime, Los Angeles is at the state average, so its NFA
rate expressed in terms of property crime coverage or Part I coverage
would be unjustified.
What about the composition of violent crime? Could it be that
High Use counties experience worse types of violent crime? The
answer is no. As seen in Table 4, rates of all four categories of
violent crime are below the state average in High Use counties. More
importantly, the numbers of more serious crimes are not high enough
to drive differences in NFA. There simply are not that many rapes
and homicides to account for the difference, even if High Use
counties had a 100% clearance rate on those crimes.
Table 4: Average Yearly NFA and Violent Crime Rates, by
Offense, 2000–2009

NFA
Homicide
Forcible
Rape
Robbery
Aggravated
Assault

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

High
Low
Los
Middle State
Use
Use
Angeles Use
Average
223.57
122.04
211.87
167.99
184.58
6.81

8.66

14.91

6.54

9.51

37.41

42.36

37.85

41.34

39.43

173.83
404.62

293.87
491.05

423.43
652.07

139.60
421.65

271.84
498.92
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Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except VC
Coverage Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages
include Los Angeles County.76
I will now discuss each of the segments of the state in greater
detail, describing how they are different and what impact each has on
the overall state prison population.
1. High Use Counties: Dominated by NFA Surplus Counties
The High Use counties are made up of three more or less equal
numbers of counties: those in the top quartile of coverage, those in
the top quartile of NFA surplus, and those who were in both. Though
the numbers of counties are similar, their populations are not. The
counties in the NFA surplus group are the overwhelming source of
this segment’s population, and will get the majority of the analysis.

76. Id.
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Table 5: High Use Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009
High
Coverage

High
Surplus
NFA

Both

High
Use
Total

State
Total

High
Use as
% of
State
Total

Population
(millions)

.18

10.94

.62

11.74

36.51

32.16%

Number of
Counties

6

8

4

18

58

31.03%

Prison
Population

1,085

49,391

4,603

55,079

164,000

33.60%

NFA

271.68

215.75

344.10

223.57

184.58

38.46%

Violent
Crime

497.50

626.19

598.84

622.67

819.70

24.12%

54.61%

34.45%

57.46%

35.90%

22.52%

N/A

3,882.92

5,274.60

5,109.53

5,243.54

Coverage
Rate
Part I
Crime
Rate

5,596.56

29.75%

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. NFA, Violent Crime,
and Part I Crime Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR off 10-year
averages. State averages include Los Angeles County.77
Counties in the “high coverage” and “both” groups are generally
too small to make much of a difference statewide. High coverage
counties in particular are not populated enough to make much of an
impact on the state’s prison population or on its bottom line. The
counties with both high coverage and high NFA surplus are also
small, but they incarcerate at such high coverage rates that they
nevertheless manage to make it into the top quartile of surplus NFA.
NFA rates for the “both” group are nearly twice that of the state

77. Id.
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average (344.1 versus 184.58), even though violent crime rates are
just three-quarters of the state rate (598.84 versus 819.70).78 This
yields a coverage rate more than twice that of the state average
(57.46% versus 22.52%).79 These counties are so far out of step with
the rest of the state that despite having just over 620,000 people, the
average yearly total subsidy for this group of counties is almost thirty
million dollars.80
The NFA surplus group is relatively tame by comparison,
incarcerating at a coverage rate only fifty percent more than the state
average. In fact, looking at NFA rates alone (184.58 for the state,
215.75 for the NFA surplus group), the subsidy group does not
appear to be so unusual. But these NFA figures are higher despite the
fact that the justifications for prison—crime rates—are below the
state average in all three major categories of violent crime, property
crime (not pictured), and Part I crime. Again, this underscores the
fundamental difference between looking at prison usage alone—i.e.,
NFA rates—and tying that usage to its justification. In some cases,
looking at NFA rates based on county population alone can obscure
the fact that a county lacks a crime-based justification for the level of
incarceration it uses.
2. High Surplus Revisited: The Rich Four and the Poor Four
The high surplus counties can be further divided on the basis of
income. These counties divide neatly into two groups of four, both
with roughly the same population. The “Rich Four” counties are
Orange, Placer, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara. Three of these
counties reported incomes above the state per capita average for each
of the ten years in the study. One of them, Santa Barbara, was above
the state average seven times and missed by less than $617 the other
three times. The “Poor Four” counties are Fresno, Kern, Riverside,
and San Bernardino. Each of these counties reported incomes below

78. See supra Table 5; supra Table 6.
79. See supra Table 5; supra Table 6.
80. See infra Table 19 and accompanying text.
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the state per capita average for all ten years, with none coming within
$8,000 of the state average in any of those years.
Table 6: The Rich Four and the Poor Four, Average Yearly
Values, 2000-2009

Rich Four
5.52

State Total
5.42
36.51

3.68

3.40

23.98

17,280

32,111

164,000

149.31
442.79

287.46
824.17

184.58
819.70

Property
Crime Rate

1,887.55

3,447.97

2,768.84

Part I Crime
Rate

3,967.13

6,686.01

5,596.56

Population
(millions)
APAR
Population
(millions)
Prison
Population
NFA
Violent
Crime Rate

Poor Four

Coverage
33.72%
34.88%
22.52%
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on tenyear averages.81
This chart reveals how coverage changes the analysis. The Rich
Four and Poor Four have dramatically different NFA rates, but
because they also have dramatically different violent crime rates,
their coverage rates are very similar. If one looked only at NFA rates
per 100,000 APAR, the Rich Four appear to use very little prison,
81. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”; Rich Four figures
begin on line 220).
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with an NFA around nineteen percent below the state average. The
problem is that the Rich Four’s violent crime rate is approximately
forty-six percent below the state average. The Rich Four incarcerate
less than the state average, but not as little as their crime rate
indicates. Overuse is relative, and below-average NFA can be high
use if a county’s crime rate is sufficiently low.
The Poor Four, on the other hand, have violent crime rates slightly
above the state average, but their NFA rate is more than fifty percent
greater than the state’s NFA. They are justified in incarcerating at a
slightly higher rate, but not nearly as much as they do. Again,
looking at NFA rates themselves obscures the fact that violent crime
is not driving rates of incarceration.
The Rich Four and the Poor Four are a drain on the rest of the
state. To the extent that these counties are being subsidized for prison
usage that cannot be explained by reported violent crime, the Rich
Four in particular cannot justify their subsidy on the basis of need. It
would be difficult to argue that these counties are due a larger share
of the state prison budget either because they cannot afford it or
because crime demands that they do so. In fact, the Rich Four can
afford to fund their prisons independently and the counties are
relatively safe. The Poor Four do not have the same resources as the
Rich Four, but they consume many more prison resources than the
Rich Four and more than the state coverage rate would indicate. To
the extent the state needs to focus on overcrowding, however, these
are the counties that incarcerate at a high rate and in large numbers.
3. Low Use Counties: The Convergence of Low Coverage and
NFA Deficits
Low Use counties are clustered in the “both” category of both low
coverage and NFA deficits—that is, negative surplus NFA numbers.
The eleven counties that contain most of the Low Use counties’
population also have the lowest coverage rates, meaning they have
large NFA deficits. All members of the Low Use group pay a
substantial prison tax.
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Table 7: Low Use Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009
Low
Coverage

NFA
Deficits
(minus
L.A.)

Both

Low Use
Total

State
Total

Low Use
as % of
State
Total

Population
(millions)

.06

3.03

7.08

10.17

36.51

27.85%

Number of
Counties

2

1

11

14

58

24.14%

Prison
Population

1,262

12,713

24,183

37,023

164,000

22.59%

NFA Rate

124.53

140.93

113.89

122.04

184.58

18.77%

Violent
Crime
Rate

648.35

671.93

908.08

835.94

819.70

28.96%

19.21%

20.97%

12.54%

14.60%

22.52%

N/A

4,340.26

5,051.86

7,003.53

6404.46

5,596.56

32.49%

Coverage
Rate
Part I
Crime
Rate

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. NFA,Violent Crime, and
Part I Crime Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR off 10 year
averages. State averages include Los Angeles County.82
As stated earlier, Los Angeles was in the NFA surplus bottom
quartile but is being excluded for other reasons, leaving this group
with only San Diego in the NFA deficit category. San Diego has
violent and Part I crime rates well below the state average, and a
coverage rate around 1.5% below the state average. Because it is a
populous county, however, small changes in coverage result in large
changes to the calculated NFA surplus. For example, San Diego
appeared in the top quartile for NFA surplus twice, but because it

82. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”).
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was in the bottom quartile seven years, I included it in the Low Use
list. The low coverage counties, Alpine and San Benito, are too small
to be worthy of commentary.
The rest of the counties in the group are relatively populous. The
“both” counties have a coverage rate equaling a third of the coverage
rate in High Use counties. These counties have violent crime and Part
I crime rates well above the state average, while their NFA is just
two-thirds of the state average. In these counties, which constitute
twenty percent of the state’s population, higher violent crime rates
are associated with lower prison use.
4. Low Coverage and NFA Deficits Divided by Income: The High
Five and the Low Six
These counties can be divided into relatively equal populations on
the basis of income, but they do not divide as neatly as the High Use
counties. Including only the counties below the state per capita
income level in all ten years would have resulted in an unequal
division of population. Thus, I added two counties with the next
lowest incomes—Nevada and Sonoma—to the four counties with
below-average incomes (Imperial, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and
Stanislaus). The richer five counties are Alameda, Contra Costa,
Marin, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz.
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Table 8: Dividing Low Coverage, NFA Deficit Counties,
Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009

Low Six

High Five

State Total
3.85
36.51

Population
3.23
(millions)
APAR
2.09
2.64
23.98
Population
(millions)
Prison
14,797
9,386
164,000
Population
NFA
158.09
78.96
184.58
Violent
961.07
866.2
819.70
Crime Rate
Property
3744.92
2952.36
2,768.84
Crime Rate
Part I Crime
7,521.39
6,594.29
5,596.56
Rate
Coverage
16.45%
9.12%
22.52%
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on tenyear averages.83
Table 8 summarizes the differences between the two groups. Note
that the distribution of crime among these counties does not track
income group as it did with the Rich Four and the Poor Four. Both
sets of crime rates are above the state average, and they are more or
less equally distributed on either side: Marin (rich) and Nevada
(poor) have violent crime rates in the 300’s, Alameda and San
Francisco (rich), Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus (poor)
have violent crime rates above 1000, and Contra Costa and Santa
Cruz (rich), Imperial and Sonoma (poor) are in the 500 and 600’s.84
Coverage rates are generally lower in the high income areas,
however, as are NFA.
83. Id.
84. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data 10y avg as #s”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

46

Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not

2012]

TOUGH ON CRIME

1033

5. Los Angeles
Los Angeles County is atypically large, accounting for slightly less
than a third of the state’s population and about a third of its prison
population, but its prison usage is not atypically high when its high
violent crime rate is taken into account. On a per capita basis, L.A.’s
NFA rate is higher than the state average. However, its violent crime
rate is almost fifty percent greater than the state average. The
coverage variable expresses this relationship more simply: L.A.’s
coverage rate is less than the state average, and about half that of the
High Use counties. L.A. does have below average property and Part I
crime rates, however, and an analysis that does not center on violent
crime might conclude that L.A.’s prison usage is not justified.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

47

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4

1034

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

Figure 4: Los Angeles County and the Rest of the State, 200085
2009
Ratio of Los Angeles County Values to Rest of California (1 Denotes Equal Values)
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The above chart summarizes L.A.’s relationship to the rest of the
state graphically. L.A. comes in generally at about forty to fifty
percent of the rest of the state numbers, except for violent crime in
the early part of the past decade.
6. Middle Use Counties
The populations of these counties are in the small to medium
range, spanning from tiny Sierra County to relatively populous San
Mateo and Ventura counties. Yearly coverage rates bounce around,
reaching lows of about one-third of the state coverage rate and highs
of several times the state rate. Annual NFA rates range from less than
85. See supra note 27 (chart taken from COUNTY COMPARISONS (tab “LA Chart”); chart data based
on TOUGH CHART DATA (tab “All Data”).
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100 to more than 400 in particular years. These counties were ones
that might have particular years—or even several years—of High or
Low Use that nevertheless did not exhibit the kind of consistency
(seven of ten years) required for inclusion into either group.
III. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
This section explores factors other than violent crime that could
have caused disparities in prison use. I first look at whether counties
are sentencing different types of offenders to state prison. That is,
perhaps the violent crime/NFA disparity among groups of counties is
a result of High Use counties sending more property offenders to
prison, or perhaps Low Use counties send fewer violent offenders to
prison. I conclude that this is not the case. I then look at the number
of drug offenders sent to prison. Because I have already looked at
property crime and Part I crime (the general crime rate), and because
other types of crime (notably sex offenses) are not numerous enough
to account for the disparity, I consider whether drug offenders
account for the difference between High Use and Low Use counties. I
then look at law enforcement, using general arrest data as a crude
proxy for how active a force is, to try to explore whether high
coverage is simply a matter of more active (or effective) law
enforcement. I next look to in-county dispositions—jail and
probation—to see if differential usage of these resources explains
differences in prison usage. I next look at local resources—using per
capita income as a proxy—as a means of exploring whether counties
rely on prison because they do not have the money to do anything
else. I examine the role of politics by analyzing voter registration
numbers, to see if party politics or levels of participation might
explain what is different about different segments of the state.
From time to time, I will discuss state segments as they bear on the
variables in question. These factors will not operate similarly across
counties—California is a huge, diverse place. The principal statistical
inquiry was, of course, whether violent crimes explain differences in
prison usage. This part attempts to shed some light on what might
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explain differences in usage, although it should be seen only as a
very preliminary investigation.
A. Offender Mix
I have thus far examined only violent crime and new felon
admissions (NFA) and concluded that High Use counties are overincarcerating relative to the state average and Low Use counties are
under-incarcerating relative to the state average. But it could be the
case that these differences in NFA levels can be explained by the
types of offenders being sent to prison—what I will call the “offender
mix” of a county’s prison population. Perhaps High Use and Low
Use counties respond at the same rate to violent crimes, but their
responses to property and drug crimes explain why High Use
counties use prison at a greater rate. That is, perhaps High Use
counties spend a greater percentage of prison resources on drug and
property offenders.86 It could also be true that Low Use counties’
lower NFA rates are not necessarily the result of them ignoring
violent crime but a result of having lower NFA numbers for nonviolent offenses. In other words, Low Use counties might be laserfocused on violent crime and use prison for those offenses alone.
In this section I use non-public data from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as part of an official
request from the Offender Information Services Unit (OIS).87 The
data contains all county commitments to state prison for the years
2000-2009. The data includes offense, offense category, and sentence
lengths. Because the categories used by the CDCR (e.g. Crimes
Against Persons) include different offenses from those in the FBI’s
UCR categories (e.g. Violent Crimes), I recoded the offense
categories to try to match crime reporting data.88 I note also that the
86. Alternatively, it might be the case that, say, a given High Use county has a huge problem with
property offenses. Their resulting incarceration rate might not be an overreaction to violent crime, but a
rational response to property offenses. These property NFA would distort the coverage rate (violent
crime to NFA) and give misleading results.
87. W. DAVID BALL, SENTENCE LENGTHS DB DEC. 2011 (2011), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow Sentence Lengths DB Dec. 2011.xls hyperlink);
see also infra Part IV.B.
88. The CDCR categories in the data I received were Crimes Against Persons, Drug Crimes,
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numbers of offenders in the CDCR OIS data are slightly higher than
the yearly numbers from the CDCR’s published statistics (between
1.5 and 5.5 percent).89 Accordingly, I will refrain from comparing
prison population numbers from the two sources. I nevertheless will
report results from the OIS and make comparisons within this data
set.
Table 9: NFA Offender Mix, Total Values, 2000-2009
High
Use

Low
Use

Los
Angeles

Middle Use

State Total

Violent
Crimes as
% of
Segment
NFA

13.54%

19.22%

18.97%

14.64%

16.43%

Property
Crimes as
% of
Segment
NFA

16.97%

18.43%

18.74%

14.67%

17.54%

Property Crimes, Other Crimes, and Uncategorized. Crimes Against Persons includes certain sex
offenses not included in the FBI’s Violent Crimes definition (e.g. oral copulation, other sex offenses,
and sodomy). See UCR Offense Definitions, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS,
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). For Violent Crimes, I included all
forms of homicide (including vehicular manslaughter), robbery, rape, and assault with a deadly weapon.
I did not include kidnapping or other assault/battery. For Property Crimes, I included first and seconddegree burglary, grand theft, and motor vehicle theft. For Part I, I included all crimes above and added
arson and petty theft with a prior offense. I put other violent and property crimes in separate categories
(Other Violent and Other Property), made a separate category for Sex Offenses, and put DUIs and
weapons possession charges in Other Crimes.
89. The OIS numbers include all offenders sentenced in a given year, whereas the CDCR’s
published statistics are simply a year-end population count. Because some offenders served less than
one year during the period of the study, more offenders were sentenced in a given year than were
reflected in the year-end head count. I note again that these figures are for sentenced new felon
admissions—they do not include parole violators. I say this only to distinguish short-term NFA
sentences from short-term parole violation sentences.
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Part I as %
of Segment
NFA

33.90%

41.58%

42.95%

33.70%

38.13%

Drug
Crimes as
% of
Segment
NFA

31.18%

27.63%

28.12%

27.08%

29.09%

Sex
Offenses as
% of NFA

5.52%

6.01%

4.00%

6.77%

5.29%

Other
Violent
Offenses as
% of NFA

9.25%

7.74%

6.73%

10.57%

8.33%

Other
Property
Offenses as
% of NFA

8.80%

6.40%

6.53%

9.01%

7.66%

Other
Offenses as
% of NFA

11.36%

10.65%

11.67%

12.87%

11.49%

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on tenyear totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories based on
FBI definitions.90
Based on the data, we can reject the theory that High Use counties
are incarcerating more because they focus on violent offenders. High
Use counties do not spend a greater percentage of their prison
90. See BALL supra note 87.
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resources incarcerating violent offenders, or even Part I offenders.
High Use and Middle Use counties have a much lower percentage of
violent and Part I crimes in their offender mix (albeit off a higher
base rate of incarceration). Low Use counties and Los Angeles
concentrate their prison usage on Part I crimes, with over forty-two
percent of their NFA coming from this category. High Use counties
have greater percentages of drug offenders in their offender pool, as
well as larger numbers of “other” violent and property crimes (those
crimes which are not part of the FBI property and violent crime
categories). These are escape, forgery/fraud, kidnapping, other
assault/battery, other property offenses, and receiving stolen
property.
Historical information about offender mix will become particularly
important as California undergoes realignment,91 because, moving
forward, counties will only be able to sentence those who have
committed violent, sexual, or serious offenses to state prison. Thus,
there may be a separate value in isolating what percentage of
offenders from each county would be prison-eligible after
realignment and use that as a historical baseline for comparing preand post-realignment NFA and offender mix. Using Part I crimes as a
rough proxy, it appears that a greater number of High Use admissions
from 2000-2009 would be ineligible for prison under the new
realignment guidelines. All other things being equal (especially
reported violent crime), one should expect post-realignment prison
commitments in High Use counties to decrease by a greater rate than
in Low Use counties. If they do not, that might suggest that these
counties have responded to realignment by changing other policies,
such as those relating to charging and sentencing.
B. Effectiveness
As we have seen, differences in violent crime rates inadequately
explain differences in NFA rates.92 In this section, I look at other
91. See discussion infra Part V.
92. In Table 18, I also calculate reported Property Crime and Part I Crime coverage rates, concluding
that these crime rates also inadequately explain differences in NFA rates. See infra Table 18.
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types of crimes—notably drug crimes—for a possible explanation.
As stated earlier, drug crimes themselves are not reported. Therefore
I will use drug arrests as a very crude measurement of actual drug
crimes. There are obvious problems with this method because arrests
are never a complete—or accurate—measure of any criminal activity.
Because drugs are such a big part of the prison system, however, I
have decided to attempt an explanation rather than avoid the subject
entirely. This analysis, however, should be taken even more
provisionally than the rest of this Article. In this section, I will also
look at the percentage of reported crimes that result in actual prison
sentences to help isolate what happens between the report of a crime
and sentencing.
Arrest data might be used as a proxy for law enforcement activity,
law enforcement effectiveness, and/or for differences in policing
strategies. One might associate higher arrest rates with broken
windows style policing, or perhaps lower rates with a less active (or
more cautious) force. Without getting into the merits of different
policing strategies, this section analyzes whether policing inputs
could explain differences in NFA. For Table 10, I calculated arrest
coverage rates for reported violent and property crimes. These
coverage rates measured the number of arrests per reported crime. I
compared these arrest coverage figures with clearance rates (the
percentage of cases deemed closed).
Table 10: Arrest Data, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009
High
Use
NFA
Total Offense
Arrests
Violent
Offense

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

Low Use

Los
Angeles

Middle
Use

State Average

223.57

122.04

211.87

167.99

184.58

1,802.26

1,864.45

1,858.76

1,730.58

1,826.38

458.77

452.07

502.76

461.47

469.22
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Arrests
Arrest
Coverage of
Reported
Violent
Crimes

73.68%

54.08%

44.56%

75.76%

57.24%

Violent
Crime
Clearance
Rate

47.36%

41.69%

44.81%

50.46%

45.05%

Property
Offense
Arrests

472.42

481.17

473.75

418.01

468.46

Arrest
Coverage of
Property
Crimes

18.04%

15.35%

17.04%

18.20%

16.92%

Sex Offense
Arrests

36.06

28.27

26.93

37.00

31.47

Drug Arrests

532.34

565.52

592.97

473.87

551.01

Dangerous
Drugs Arrests

354.15

260.34

220.65

301.69

284.46

69.33

63.19

80.52

69.94

70.72

Weapons
Arrests

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except
percentages are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages include
Los Angeles County.93
Arrest data reveals almost no significant differences across the
four segments for total arrests, property arrests, sex offenses, drug
93. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. Most of the data comes from the tab “Stats by County
Segment.” (NFA figures are from the tab “Rates per 100k APAR”.) Property Arrest Coverage is
calculated in row AE beneath individual county segments (e.g., High Use Counties’ Property Arrest
Coverage is calculated in AE170). Violent Crime Clearance Rate was calculated by filtering counties in
the tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter” and reading GE590 (“rate”) amounts.
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arrests, and weapons arrests. In addition, sex offense arrests are too
infrequent to make a difference in NFA rates. Two areas which merit
closer study are dangerous drug arrests per 100,000 APAR and the
arrest coverage rate for violent crime. Both are much higher in High
Use counties than in Los Angeles County or the Low Use counties.
Higher dangerous drug arrests may suggest that the severity, if not
the number, of drug crimes are worse in High Use areas. High Use
counties do, in fact, have a greater percentage of drug offenders in
their NFA pool, although the median sentence length of High Use
drug crime sentences is at the state average, suggesting that the
sentenced crimes are not more severe, even if arrest activity is
greater.94 The high ratio of violent crime arrests to violent crime
suggests that violent crimes are policed more aggressively in High
Use counties, leading to more prosecutions and more prison time.
High Use clearance rates are higher than in Los Angeles or the Low
Use counties, but the difference between High and Low clearance
rates is not nearly as large as the difference between High and Low
Arrest Coverage, suggesting an independent carceral effect to police
activity irrespective of the eventual disposition of the case.
The next table examines what one might call “actual” coverage—
the number of NFA by offense compared to reported numbers of
those offenses. Coverage is just a proxy; this chart examines the
actual pipeline from report to sentence, sorted by crime type.
Table 11: Reported Crimes and New Felon Admissions by
Crime, Total Values, 2000-2009
High Use

Low Use

Total NFA
Sentenced

177,799

88,061

Total Reported
Violent Crimes

474,266

569,291

Los Angeles
140,971
739,556

Middle
Use

State Total

51,664

458,495

182,926

1,966,039

94. See supra Table 9 and accompanying text (providing data on the percentage of drug offenders as
a proportion of NFA); infra Table 20 and accompanying text (providing data on sentence length).
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Total Violent
Crime Prison
Sentences

24,082

16,925

26,741

7,565

75,313

% Reported
Violent Crimes
Resulting in
Prison

5.08%

2.97%

3.62%

4.14%

3.83%

Total Reported
Property
Crimes

1,994,605

2,134,530

1,822,269

689,592

6,640,996

Total Property
Crime Prison
Sentences

30,174

16,229

26,422

7,577

80,402

% Reported
Property
Crimes
Resulting in
Prison

1.51%

.76%

1.45%

1.10%

1.21%

4,643,006

4,981,645

4,195,939

1,694,573

15,515,163

Total Part I
Crime Prison
Sentences

60,276

36,616

60,544

17,411

174,847

% Reported
Part I Crimes
Resulting in
Prison

1.30%

.74%

1.44%

1.03%

1.13%

Total Reported
Part I Crimes

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. Sentence figures based
on ten-year totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories
based on FBI definitions.95

95. See supra note 27. The data for this chart can be found in the spreadsheet “Table 11 data”. The
data on sentenced offenders comes from the Spreadsheet “sentence lengths db dec 2011”, beginning at
cell N90227; the data on reported crimes comes from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “Stats by
County Segment”.
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The above data stands out because of the relationship of reported
crime to prison sentences. Violent crime prison sentences as a
percentage of reported violent crime is, even in high use counties,
vanishingly small, with NFA accounting for, at most, just over five
percent of reported violent crimes. This is not to say, of course, that
there are few crimes solved. I note from the prior table that clearance
rates are well into the double digits. These numbers could be
explained in part by serial offenders, each responsible for multiple
crimes, meaning each NFA would account for several reported
crimes. Note, too, that these numbers only refer to prison, not
punishment, effectiveness, or clearance in general. That is, this data
illuminates where offenders are punished—not whether they are
punished. Counties might sentence offenders to jail or probation, they
might drop charges, and, of course, a significant number of crimes go
unsolved.96 Having said that, violent offenders in High Use counties
are still more likely to get prison time than violent offenders in Low
Use counties, even though both figures are relatively small.
But, even if we were to assume that prison usage is somehow
correlated with effectiveness (even at these low levels) and that High
Use counties devote more energy and resources towards fighting
crime—and do so more effectively—responding to violent crime
aggressively is still a policy response to violent crime, not a
necessary function of it. Accordingly, this policy—as with all good
policies—is subject to the key question: why should the state pay for
it? If it is good policy,97 after all, the county should happily make the
investment itself. The individual county is the polity that made the
choice to deal with crime in this fashion, and the individual county is
the polity that will benefit. The issue is not whether the policies in
question are good or bad. The issue is why the state should pay for
something it has no control over, a policy that benefits a readily
identifiable subset of the population (the county) which drew up and
implemented the policy. Even if we were to think the state should be
subsidizing these kinds of choices, questions remain: why subsidize
96. See infra Part IV.
97. If it is, in fact, a policy and not either random or inadvertent.
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these counties and not others, and these policies and not others? Or,
is the state willing and able to subsidize all counties who wish to
make this choice?98
C. Local Dispositions
On a zero-sum view of offender management, one might expect
that lower use of prison would result in higher use of jail and
probation. In other words, offenders not sent to prison would simply
go elsewhere in the system. That is not the case, however. High Use
counties use jails at higher rates than Low Use counties, suggesting
that High Use counties are simply more punitive and use
incarceration at a higher rate irrespective of whether the county or
state pays for it. As for probation, there is almost no difference
between Low Use and High Use counties along any of the
dimensions examined—a surprising figure that might be the result of
weaknesses in the probation data.
1. Jail
Mike Males has written a comprehensive analysis of local jails and
their ability to absorb offenders from state prisons.99 Males looked at
county jail capacities and county offender mixes to estimate whether
county jails could absorb the numbers of low-level offenders most
likely to return to them under realignment, concluding that county
jails “can provide beds for only around 38% of the 15,400 low-level,
non-strike property and drug convicts now held in state prisons.”100
Males’s study, unfortunately, only has data from one year (2009),
so I was unable to incorporate his findings fully. The following table
examines the issue using figures for jail population and jail budgets.
The table also includes percentages of jail inmates who are sentenced
and not sentenced. Non-sentenced inmates can be those too
98. For a discussion of the fiscal implications of this question, see infra Part IV.
99. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA COUNTY JAILS
ABSORB
LOW-LEVEL
STATE
PRISONERS?
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf.
100. Id. at 4.
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dangerous to be released before trial, those unable to post bail, or
those awaiting processing. Because California Department of Justice
expenditure data101 is based on a fiscal year that goes from July 1 to
June 30,102 I averaged adjacent years to calculate an estimated yearly
total. That is, figures for 2000 are the average of 1999-2000 and
2000-2001. There are no police expenditures for Alpine County; the
sheriff provides the county with all of its law enforcement.103 These
figures extend only to 2007.
Table 12: Jail Statistics, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009
High Use

Low Use

Los Angeles

Middle Use

State Total

Jail
Population

363.96

323.30

282.49

353.17

328.80

Sentenced

121.14

115.31

92.54

137.33

113.70

Non
Sentenced

242.83

207.99

189.95

215.87

215.11

% Sentenced

33.28%

35.67%

32.76%

38.89%

34.58%

% County
CJ Budget
Spent on Jail

14.99%

16.44%

10.54%

17.64%

14.18%

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except
Budget are calculated per 100,000 APAR; Budget figures through
2007 only. County criminal justice budget is the sum of probation,
jail, and law enforcement budgets.104

101. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county crimes data, see Statistics:
Expenditures, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ExpenCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data
was taken by following hyperlinks to each county).
102. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52, at 4.
103. Email on file with the Georgia State University Law Review.author.
104. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). “Stats by County
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”.
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The jail numbers do not support the theory that Low Use counties
are sentencing their offenders to jail rather than prison. Jail use is
higher in both High and Middle Use counties than in Los Angeles
and the Low Use counties. This tends to support the theory that High
Use counties use more of all forms of incarceration, not just those
subsidized by the state. These differences, however, are not nearly as
stark as those involving NFA. What these population figures do not
account for, however, is how crowded jails are, and whether these
populations are near the jail’s capacity. Males did not adopt my
violent crime coverage methodology, nor did he group counties by
prison use. However, looking at his list of counties with insufficient
space to absorb low-level state prisoners, we see that all of the Rich
Four and three of the Poor Four (Kern, Riverside, and San
Bernardino) are rated as having insufficient unused jail capacity to
absorb returning prisoners.105 On the Low Use side, focusing only on
the combined low coverage/low subsidy group, only those counties
with incomes below the average state per capita income in all four
years of the study (Imperial, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and
Stanislaus) have insufficient jail space. The other seven counties have
sufficient jail space.106 At the margin, sentencing decisions might be
affected by local jail capacity—without jail beds, county officials
might perhaps feel pressure to push for prison-eligible sentences and
charges.
Finally, I note that almost two-thirds of jail populations are nonsentenced, which is in line with the national average.107 U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder recently remarked that “[a]lmost all of
these individuals could be released and supervised in their
communities—and allowed to pursue or maintain employment, and
participate in educational opportunities and their normal family
lives—without risk of endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing
105. See supra note 100. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA
COUNTY
JAILS
ABSORB
LOW-LEVEL
STATE
PRISONERS?
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Eric Tucker, Holder: Petty Offenders Should Await Trial at Home, Associated Press, June 1,
2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13737523.
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from justice.”108 The problem is that many non-sentenced offenders
cannot make bail; Holder suggested, instead, that they be released on
their own recognizance. The numbers suggest that at least a
preliminary exploration of this alternative is warranted to deal with
jail overcrowding.
2. Probation
Counties use probation in dramatically different ways, and an
entire article could be devoted to the ways in which statewide
statistics obscure real local trends. Statewide figures on total
probation caseloads indicate that statewide probation use has not
changed, but several counties within the period of study have moved
dramatically in non-random ways, expanding in some counties and
contracting in others.109 To cite just a few examples: in Riverside
County, total caseload almost doubled from 2000 to 2009, and new
admissions more than doubled.110 In Santa Clara County, new
admissions (both total and felony only) almost doubled, but total
caseload decreased around forty percent.111 In Orange County, total
caseload was also almost cut in half, but new admissions for felons
stayed roughly the same.112 Probation might be one area in which
county policies show real year-to-year variations, and it is certainly
deserving of a much closer analysis than I give it here.
Table 13: Probation Use by Segment, Average Yearly Values,
2000-2009
High Use
Probation

1,461.59

Low Use
1,444.00

Los Angeles

Middle Use

937.23

2,245.17

State
Total
1,411.40

108. Id.
109. Note that some probation data is missing. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TREND DATA FOOTNOTES (2009), available at
OF
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf.
110. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Caseload
Probation
Budget

$6,933

$7,074

$7,137

$7,355

$7,082

% Felony

76.51%

79.31%

86.68%

58.90%

75.66%

904.66

809.95

363.77

1,070.32

750.69

% Felony

73.99%

78.40%

88.93%

60.09%

74.84%

% County
CJ Budget
Spent on
Probation

12.34%

12.10%

9.38%

13.46%

11.40%

Probation
New
Admissions

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except
percentage figures are calculated per 100,000 APAR. All calculations
made on ten-year averages except budget figures, which are through
2007 only. County criminal justice budget is the sum of probation,
jail, and law enforcement budgets.113
These numbers are, frankly, surprising. Some of the data is not
complete, and probation data is limited to “original grants of
probation and do[es] not include subsequent grants of probation to
those already under supervised probation in the same county.”114 It is
unclear, though, how the results obtained could be fully explained by
this. I am reluctant to draw any conclusions of my own from Table
13, but I will instead point out areas that require explanation.
Probation budgets are almost identical, and Low Use and High Use
counties have similar caseloads and felony populations. Los Angeles
has fewer total probation cases and dramatically lower new
admissions, suggesting perhaps that probation in Los Angeles County
is longer-term than in High and Low Use counties. I am unsure
whether there is a quality-versus-quantity story to be told here or why
113. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “States by County Segment”). “Stats by County
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”.
114. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA CHARACTERISTICS
AND KNOWN LIMITATIONS (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/limits.pdf.
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both probation and jail use are higher in High Use counties. This
might also be one area where individual counties behave so
differently within segments that patterns are not readily discernible.
D. Local Resources
Local resources were measured by looking at per capita income—
both per capita income itself and the difference between per capita
income and state per capita income. I chose not to look at gross
population size of a county as a measure of resources. The
relationship of Total Population to NFA rates is not statistically
significant at the 1% level (p = .089). The amount that Total
Population explains in NFA rates is small (r2 = .005), which means
changes in Total Population explain less than .5% of the variance in
NFA rates. And, the standard error is relatively large (root mean
squared error (RMSE) = 63.35824. RMSE is a guide to how closely
the data fits the trend line).
Figures for per capita income were obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.115 These figures do not account for income
inequality within a given county, which might be relevant in
explaining crime and responses to crime, particularly where property
crimes are concerned. I take per capita income as a measure of
resources independent of criminal justice budgets. Note also that state
criminal justice funding is not necessarily related to per capita
income, where poorer counties get more resources.116

115. Local Area Personal Income, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS,
http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?selTable=CA1-3&section=2 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011)
(selected “Per Capita Personal Income,” “California,” and the years 2000–2009).
116. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. As a reminder, state funding is not related to crime
rates, either. Id. Because some funding comes from a county’s share of state sales tax revenues, we
might expect more criminal justice resources in wealthier counties. Id.
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Table 14: Per Capita Income by Segment, Average Yearly
Values, 2000-2009
High
Use

Low Use

Los Angeles

Middle Use

State Total

Mean Per
Capita
Income

$36,893

$42,611

$36,198

$38,490

$38,492

Max

$60,038

$93,263

$42,195

$72,576

$93, 263

Min

$16,920

$18,973

$29,865

$18,542

$16, 920

9,013

15,103

4,313

9,615

11,770

Mean
Difference
From
State
Average

-$1,614

$4,176

-$2,195

$64

N/A

Max
Difference

$22,161

$49,410

-$1,528

$29,336

N/A

Min
Difference

-$17,864

-$16,498

-$3,533

-$18,104

N/A

8,374

14,437

523

8,831

N/A

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Deviation

Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were
weighted based on county population.117
Generally, Low Use counties have higher per capita incomes:
approximately $6,000 higher than High Use counties and Los
Angeles.118 All income figures across all segments, however, had a
117. Chart data based on filtered data in “Per capita income recalculation” spreadsheet, which took
per capita income from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “All Data”, multiplied by total population,
and divided total figures.
118. These numbers were calculated to account for county population size. I took per capita income in
a given county for a given year and multiplied that number by the county’s population that year. I added
these figures for a given segment of the state and divided by total population for that segment. Figures
were not adjusted for inflation.
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great deal of variation, and the richest group, Low Use, had the
highest coefficient of variation. The gap between the highest and
lowest reported county incomes for all three segments besides Los
Angeles was at least $40,000. These same segments reported
incomes of more than $15,000 below and $20,000 above the state per
capita income level in a given year. Income merits further study. A
project that divides the state into income segments might reveal
further insights about the relationship between income levels and
prison usage.
Table 15: Per Capita Income of High Use Counties, Average
Yearly Values, 2000-2009
High
Coverage

High NFA
Surplus

Rich Four

Poor Four

High
Coverage and
NFA Surplus

Mean Per
Capita
Income

$27,089

$37,567

$47,484

$27,481

$27,872

Max

$40,721

$60,038

$60,038

$31,111

$34,432

Min

$18,021

$21,517

$33,307

$21,517

$16,920

Mean
Difference
From
State
Average

-$11,319

-$945

$9,057

-$11,118

-$10,593

Max
Difference

-$1,674

$22,161

$22,161

-$8,123

-$6,699

Min
Difference

-$17,864

-$13,828

-$617

-$13,828

-$17,455

Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were
weighted by county population.119
119. Chart data based on filtered data in “Per capita income recalculation” spreadsheet, which took
per capita income from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “All Data”, multiplied by total population,
and divided total figures.
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In Table 15, we see that there is a sharp divide between the Rich
Four and the Poor Four. Three of the Rich Four counties were above
the average state per capita income every year in the study. Santa
Barbara was below it during only three years and even then missed it
by no more than $617. The Poor Four, however, were at least $8,000
below the average state per capita income level every single year.
The best a Poor Four county did, relative to the state average, was
still more than $7,000 less than the worst a rich county did and
almost $30,000 less than the highest Rich Four figure. The mean
difference between the two groups was approximately $20,000 a
year. The Rich Four are, in fact, the only above-average income
group of High Use counties. Neither high coverage nor high
coverage/high NFA surplus counties ever broke above the state
average per capita income level for even a single year. Again, the
Rich Four have large total populations, with around fifty percent of
the High Use segment’s total population. But none of these figures
accounts for income differences within a county; counties
undoubtedly have richer and poorer areas.
Table 16: Per Capita Income of Low Coverage/Low Surplus
Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009

Low Six
Mean Per
Capita
Income
Max
Min
Mean
Difference
From State
Average
Max
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High Five

$33,086

Low Use Without San
Francisco and Marin
$52,295
$39,800

$47,813
$18,973
-$5,395

$93,263
$39,013
$13,900

$58,228
$18,973
$1,360

$4,573

$49,410

$14,375
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Difference
Min
-$16,498
$4,880
-14,425
Difference
Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were
weighted by county population.120
Low Use counties do not divide as easily as High Use counties.
This chart looks only at the group of eleven counties with both low
coverage and low subsidies and excludes Alpine, San Benito, and
San Diego, as well as Los Angeles. There are four Low Use counties
that never had incomes above the state per capita average during any
year of the study, but an even division of this segment by population
adds two counties with above-average incomes. The mean difference
between the two groups is nearly $20,000, but this segment is made
up mostly of average-income counties with two outliers: Marin
County and San Francisco County. Recalculating the mean per capita
income of the segment without Marin and San Francisco counties
gives a mean per capita income of $39,800, approximately $1,500
higher than the state average for this period. While this number is
still above the state average, and still above that of the other three
segments, it is lower than the mean income of the Rich Four.
E. Politics
I looked at voter registration numbers for my political analysis.
Voter registration data came from the California Secretary of State.121
120. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27.
121. For the entry page for the Voter Registration and Participation Statistics, see Voter Registration
Statistics, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_u.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2011). See also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FEBRUARY 10, 2009 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2009), available
at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-09/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
JANUARY
22,
2008
REPORT
OF
REGISTRATION
(2008),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-presprim-08/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
FEBRUARY
10,
2007
REPORT
OF
REGISTRATION
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-07/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
JANUARY
3,
2006
REPORT
OF
REGISTRATION
(2006),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/154day-prim-06/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
FEBRUARY
10,
2005
REPORT
OF
REGISTRATION
(2005),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-05/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
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I used the date closest to February for years with multiple reports;
this is because odd-numbered years only have a single registration
report, which comes out in February. I collected percentage data on
total registration, Democratic and Republican registration, and those
who declined to state (as a proxy for swing voters). I calculated third
party registration by taking these three numbers and subtracting them
from 100; this procedure, admittedly, amalgamates third parties of
very different political stripes and should be read as a measure of
anti-two-party sentiment rather than, say, a measure of Green or
Libertarian sentiments. I then calculated the political valence of a
county by subtracting the percentage of Republicans from the
percentage of Democrats, yielding positive numbers for Democratic
majorities and negative numbers for Republican majorities.
I used registration data, rather than actual voting patterns, for a
number of reasons. First, I was wary of including data from actual
races out of the concern that individual candidates and/or issues
might shift turnout one way or another. Second, the data is less
readily available. Registration figures might be seen as a general
measure of civic engagement, and a baseline for individual attitudes.
I acknowledge that there is a variety of opinions expressed on crime
within parties, and that party affiliation is in no way a guarantee of
left/right tendencies or particular attitudes about crime.122
FEBRUARY
17,
2004
REPORT
OF
REGISTRATION
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-presprim-04/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
February 10, 2003 Report of Registration (2003), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/rorpages/ror-odd-year-03/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY
4, 2002 (2002), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/29day-prim-02/county.xls;
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2001 (2001), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-01/county.pdf (Sierra County is reported as
having more than 100 percent of its population registered to vote); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF
REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 2000 (2000), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/rorpages/29day-presprim-00/county.pdf.
122. Of course, it sometimes does indicate something useful. The AB 109 vote in the California
assembly, for example, was almost entirely on party lines, with all but one Democrat voting yes, and no
Republican voting yes (one member was absent or abstained). See Comm. on Budget, Unofficial Ballot,
AB 109 Budget, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0532PM_asm_floor.html. Party affiliations were
obtained at the official party websites for the California Assembly. Assembly Republican Members,
CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY: REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/?p=members (last visited
Jan. 18, 2012); Democratic Members, CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY: DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS,
http://asmdc.org/members/democratic-members (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
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I also calculated my figures without correcting for population. I
did so because I wanted to evaluate the party identity of a county’s
political leadership. In other words, this method simulates the
electoral college model, where all that matters is who finishes first,
not the popular vote model, where the margin of victory also
matters.123 My state figures are calculated means for the group of 580
counties.124
Table 17: Voter Registration by Segment, Average Yearly
Values, 2000–2009
High Use

Low Use

Los Angeles

Middle Use

State
Total

%
Registration

70.73%

73.88%

70.97%

73.95%

72.88%

%
Democrats

36.79%

46.24%

51.51%

39.27%

40.39%

%
Republicans

43.62%

31.16%

26.88%

39.63%

38.60%

Democrats
Minus
Republicans

-6.83%

15.08%

24.63%

-0.36%

1.79%

Decline to
State

14.66%

17.18%

17.04%

15.48%

15.66%

Third Party

4.93%

5.42%

4.57%

5.63%

5.34%

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are not
corrected for population; they are means of the group of counties for
2000–2009.125
123. Consider this thought experiment. If Los Angeles were 99% Democratic and every other county
were 51% Republican, popular (population-adjusted) registration numbers would indicate a heavy
advantage for Democrats, even though county policies would be under the direction of Republicans in
57 counties.
124. Actual state numbers are slightly more Democratic: 70.70% overall, 43.97% Democratic,
34.35% Republican, 9.62% Party Differential, 16.90% Decline to State, 4.79% Third Party.
125. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). “Stats by County
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”.
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All segments showed similar rates of voter registration, with a bit
more registration in Low Use counties. High Use counties had more
registered Republicans than other segments of the state, as well as
greater numbers of Republicans versus Democrats. This might
suggest that higher coverage is more associated with Republican
politics. I should caution, however, that my analysis is not
comprehensive enough to support more than a tentative observation.
Two of the Rich Four counties are Democratic, for example. Nevada,
which has an extremely low percentage of its population in prison, is
Republican.126
Intra-county distribution might affect policy, in that a county
might have Democratic cities within counties, or particular seats on
the county council. Slates for county officials specify not just party,
but person, and individual differences on criminal justice might
account for some of the observed results. Finally, individual county
council seats are drawn within counties and might heighten the
effects of how Democrats and Republicans are distributed within the
county.127
F. Reverse Causality: Is Low Crime the Product of a High NFA?
In this Part, I consider whether I have been analyzing the problem
backwards. I have analyzed whether prison is a product of crime.
Perhaps, though, crime is a product of prison. That would mean the
low crime rates associated with high NFA are an indicator that prison
works. Under this theory, because offenders in High Use counties are
subject to swift and certain punishment, this means both that there are
fewer of them left to offend (incapacitation) and that any remaining
offenders are less likely to risk prison (deterrence).

126. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter”).
127. For an evaluation of the role of party politics in sentencing commissions, see Rachel Barkow &
Kathleen O’Neil, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and
Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973 (2006). For an evaluation of the effect of elections on
District Attorneys, see Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581
(2009).
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In response, I note first that it is not logically necessary that a
decrease in crime is a sign that incarceration is working and an
increase in crime means more prisons are needed. It could just as
easily be said that a decrease in crime is a sign that fewer prisons are
needed and an increase in crime is a sign that incarceration is not
working.128 I will not attempt to determine whether changes in prison
usage are, in fact, the cause of changes in crime. I do, however, note
that this is the subject of vociferous—and voluminous—academic
debate.129 I note also that, to hearken back to the comparison of
Alameda and San Bernardino, crime rates in particular High Use
counties might be the same as those in counties which have not used
prison.
I will, instead, frame the problems in terms of the central question
of this paper. Even if one were to assume that the causation in fact
runs from prison to crime, and that High Use policies are effective,
then why should the state pay for it? The choice is made in the
county, and the benefits go to the county. If the policies are, in fact,
effective, then the counties should be happy to pay for it.
Alternatively, if the state pays for prison because it believes the
policy is worth subsidizing as a means of fighting crime, which
counties should it pay for? Can it afford to subsidize all counties at
High Use rates? Should it subsidize just prison, or should it subsidize
other policy choices as well? I discuss these and other issues in the
following section, which discusses the state’s role in funding prisons.

128. See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 16 (2007) (noting that between 1973 and 2004 the total
United States prison population rose every year (an aggregate total of 400 percent), while, during that
time, there were about an equal number of years of rising and falling crime).
129. See, e.g., William Spelman, Specifying the Relationship Between Crime and Prisons, 24 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 149, 149 (2008) (surveying several quantitative studies and finding that,
“[d]espite many years of study, the effect of prisons on crime remains a controversial question”). There
is a more accessible introduction to this debate. See Alfred Blumstein & James Q. Wilson, The Impact of
Incarceration on Crime: Two National Experts Weigh In, PEW CTR. ON STATES, Apr. 2008, available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Crime%20Incarceration%20QA.pdf.
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IV. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
This Part examines the fiscal ramifications of the state prison
subsidy. Given that the state pays for prison, and that counties use
prisons at different rates, what is the net prison subsidy (or tax) for
counties? I have heretofore adverted to the idea of subsidy without
mentioning the numbers. This Part details exactly what those
numbers are: they run into the hundreds of millions of dollars each
year for just the first year of NFA sentences. In addition to exploring
what state prison expenditures are, I also calculate what prison
expenditures might be if California emulated the High Use counties
or the Low Use ones. I also calculate what would happen if a single
segment of the state moved to another segment’s coverage rates.
There we see that if Los Angeles County alone moved to a High Use
coverage rate, for example, the fiscal impacts would be substantial.
A. Subsidy by Segment
The following table calculates prison subsidies in the manner
described earlier.130 I multiplied the coverage rate by the number of
violent crimes in a segment to come up with the “fair” or “justified”
NFA number. I then subtracted this number from actual NFA and
multiplied the result by per capita prison costs to arrive at the NFA
surplus. I also calculated the subsidy on the basis of property crime
coverage and Part I coverage, to see if an NFA rate not justified on
the basis of violent crime might be justified by some other measure
of crime.
Table 18: Prison Subsidy by Segment, Average Yearly Values,
2000–2009
High
Use
NFA

17,028

Low Use

Los
Angeles

8,311

13,888

Middle
Use
5,045

State Total
44,272

130. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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35.90%

14.60%

18.78%

27.58%

22.52%

Violent Crime

47,427

56,929

73,956

18,293

196,604

NFA if at State
Coverage Rate

10,734

12,982

16,406

4,150

N/A

6,294

-4,671

-2,518

895

N/A

Average yearly
Subsidy
(millions)

$210.05

-$166.30

-$72.73

$28.97

N/A

Highest
Individual
Yearly County
Subsidy
(Millions)

$68.78

$5.23

$.97

$12.92

N/A

Lowest
Individual
Yearly County
Subsidy
(Millions)

-$.32

-$85.90

-$145.04

-$5.79

N/A

Property
Coverage
Subsidy
(millions)

$122.10

-$201.64

$64.86

$14.67

N/A

Part I coverage
Subsidy
(millions)

$123.52

-$201.81

$71.66

$6.62

N/A

NFA Surplus
(Deficit)

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross
numbers. High and Low Subsidy figures refer to individual counties
within the respective groups.131

131. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”, columns BD (NFA),
EJ (Coverage), (G) Violent Crime, EM (NFA at State Coverage Rate), EO (Average subsidy—divided
by 10), EZ (Property Coverage), FV (Part I coverage subsidy)).
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California pays an immense amount of money to subsidize the
violent-crime-unjustified prison usage of High Use counties, an
average of $210 million a year. I emphasize that these figures are not
the cost of a county’s total NFA, but just the NFA not justified by
reported violent crime. Total NFA costs are much higher. Even
focusing solely on surplus NFA, individual counties used huge sums
of state resources: San Bernardino’s surplus prison use was
subsidized an average of $51 million a year, with a high of almost
$69 million in 2006. These figures, again, only calculate the cost of
the first year of imprisonment of NFA for that particular year, and
only for the number of NFA exceeding that justified by the statewide
violent crime coverage rate.132 During the ten years of the study, only
one of the eighteen High Use counties had a negative subsidy. Fresno
had a single year (2000) in which its prison usage was not subsidized
(-$320,000). Overall, however, Fresno’s excess prison usage cost the
state an average of more than $15 million a year between 2000 and
2009.
Low Use counties left millions of dollars of prison resources on
the table. If they had incarcerated at the statewide coverage rate, they
would have used, on average, an extra $166 million in prison
resources in the first year of NFA sentences. The difference between
the cost of High Use deviations from the state average and Low Use
deviations is more than $375 million a year, a tremendous transfer of
resources from one-third of the state to another. Individual Low Use
counties forewent huge amounts of crime-justified prison resources.
Alameda County used an average of $48 million dollars less than its
justified amount, with a high (or low) of -$85 million in 2008.
(Again, this estimate only includes the cost of the first year of
imprisonment for each new felon admission.) Estimates of Low Use
counties as a segment are somewhat dampened by the inclusion of
San Diego, which was in the top quartile for subsidies for two years
(though its average annual subsidy was -$8.5 million).
132. I note that the mean NFA sentence statewide is just over four and a half years, and the median is
two years, suggesting that the actual cost of NFA might be much greater. Note, however, that new
felons in Low Use counties are sentenced to slightly longer median prison terms. See infra Table 20 and
accompanying text.
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Los Angeles County was also on the losing end of the prison
subsidy, averaging a -$72 million subsidy for the ten years of the
study. Los Angeles spent the first five years of the past decade in the
-$100 million range, hitting a peak of -$145 million in 2003 before
dropping to -$96 million in 2004. The rest of the decade saw the Los
Angeles subsidy numbers increase as Los Angeles’s coverage rates
increased, a product both of decreasing violent crime and increased
NFA. Los Angeles had a positive net subsidy of $970,000 in 2009.
The Middle Use counties were subsidized overall, and I note again
the heterogeneity of the group. More than half of the Middle Use
counties were subsidized in nine or more years of the study.133
Table 18 also calculates subsidies according to alternative
coverage rates. If prison is justified on the basis of something other
than reported violent crime, are the subsidy numbers different? The
answer depends on which segment of the state one looks at. High Use
counties look a little less high use when coverage is calculated using
either reported property crimes or reported Part I crimes. Their
subsidy drops to a yearly average of about $122 million, a little more
than $70 million less than the yearly violent crime subsidy. Low Use
counties, however, see their prison resource shortfall grow, dropping
to below $200 million. These numbers can be explained by reference
to the relatively high property and Part I crime rates in both High and
Low Use counties. High property and Part I crime justifies more of
the High Use counties’ NFA and increases the amount of prison
resources left unused by the Low Use counties.
Perhaps the most interesting result of recalculating coverage by
property and Part I crime, though, is that Los Angeles goes from
being a net donor to a net recipient of unjustified prison resources.
Remember, Los Angeles County’s NFA rate is high on a straight per
capita basis—it is low only when adjusted for its high violent crime
rate. Because Los Angeles does not suffer from relatively high
property and Part I crime, however, its high NFA rate is no longer
133. Amador, Del Norte, Mariposa, San Luis Obispo, Siskiyou, and Tulare were subsidized in nine of
the ten years; Humboldt, Madera, Tuolomne, Ventura, Yolo and Yuba were subsidized all ten years.
They were not included in the High Use group, however, because the extent of their NFA surplus was
not sufficiently large to put them in the top quartile of the state.
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justified when adjusted for these types of crimes. Once again, the
measure of subsidy is ultimately a normative question: what prison
admissions are justified, and on what basis?

Table 19: Prison Subsidies for High Use Counties, Average
Yearly Values, 2000–2009
High
Coverage

Published by Reading Room, 2012

High NFA
Surplus

Rich Four

Poor Four

High
Coverage
and NFA
Surplus

Average
Raw NFA
Numbers
Per Year

329

15,284

5,491

9,793

1,415

Coverage

54.61%

34.45%

33.72%

34.88%

57.46%

Violent
Crime
Raw
Numbers

603

44,361

16,284

28,077

2,463

NFA if at
State
Coverage
Rate

138

10,030

3,674

6,357

566

Excess
NFA

192

5,254

1,817

3,436

849

Average
yearly
Subsidy
(millions)

$6.36

$175.37

$60.85

$114.52

$28.32

Highest
Individual
Yearly
Subsidy

$3.85

$68.78

$55.39

$68.78

$14.84
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(millions)
Lowest
Individual
Yearly
Subsidy
(millions)

$.01

-$.32

$1.16

-$.32

$2.51

Property
Coverage
Subsidy
(millions)

$5.81

$91.29

$28.27

$63.02

$25.00

Part I
coverage
Subsidy
(millions)

$5.95

$92.85

$17.37

$75.48

$24.71

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross
(non-normalized) numbers. High and Low Subsidy values are for
individual counties within the respective groups. Figures might not
add due to rounding.134
Table 19 takes a closer look at just the subsidized counties. The
Poor Four dominate here, sending, in an average year, 3,436 excess
new felons (those sent above the number calculated at the state
coverage rate). These prisoners cost an average of $115 million in
just the first year of their incarceration, and the state must pay for this
cost every year. The Rich Four also cost the state large sums of
money on the NFA they send above the state coverage rate. Two rich
counties in particular receive large subsidies: Santa Clara and
Orange, both of which received eight digit subsidies each year, an
average of more than $16 million for Santa Clara and $36 million for
Orange. The state pays for the prison sentences of these crimeunjustified prisoners even though, each year, the average citizen in

134. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”, columns BD (NFA),
EJ (Coverage), (G) Violent Crime, EM (NFA at State Coverage Rate), EO (Average subsidy—divided
by 10), EZ (Property Coverage), FV (Part I coverage subsidy)).
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these counties makes at least $4,000 more than the average
Californian.
B. The Role of Sentence Lengths
In this Part, I take a second cut at costs, examining sentence
lengths. As I have stated repeatedly, my cost estimates heretofore
have only considered the first year of confinement. To get a better
estimate of the cost of a given county’s prison usage, one must also
take sentence length into account.135 It might be the case that High
Use counties nevertheless use fewer prison resources than Low Use
counties because they send people to prison for shorter terms. Of
course, it might also be the case that High Use counties use an even
greater amount of prison resources if they not only send more people
to prison but send them there for a longer time.
I again used data from the CDCR’s OIS branch. I used data on all
individual sentences and crimes for each county from 2000 to 2009
to calculate total prison years for each county and each set of
counties. I also looked at total prison years for certain subsets of
crime (e.g. Violent Crime, Property Crime, Part I Crime), again using
FBI typology. I divided these numbers by NFA to get the mean
sentence. I also calculated the median sentence for total NFA, given
potential distorting effects of lengthy sentences. In fact, just .16% of
the total statewide number of sentences—the 746 sentences greater
than or equal to 100 years—accounts for approximately seven
percent of the total time sentenced from 2000–2009.

135. Of course, these are just estimates of the time prisoners will spend in prison. Actual time served
depends on other factors (e.g. mortality levels in prison).
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136

Table 20: Sentence Length by Segment, 2000–2009
High
Use

Low Use

Los
Angeles

Middle Use

State Total

Segment
NFA as %
of State
Total

38.78%

19.21%

30.75%

11.22%

N/A

Segment
Sentence
Years as
% of State
Total

34.65%

22.01%

31.78%

11.56%

N/A

Median
(Mean)
Sentence
in Years

2 (4.14)

2.67 (5.31)

2 (4.79)

3 (4.75)

2 (4.63)

Violent
Crime
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

4 (9.25)

5 (11.03)

5 (11.24)

5 (9.88)

5 (10.42)

Property
Crime
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

2 (2.74)

2 (3.08)

2 (2.66)

2 (3.35)

2 (2.84)

Part I
Crime
Median

2 (5.31)

2 (6.69)

2.67 (6.40)

3 (6.11)

2.67 (6.05)

136. See BALL, supra note 87. Mean sentence data (calculated) begins at cell N90228. Median figures
were calculated manually, filtering by months.
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(Mean)
Sentence
Years
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Drug
Crime
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

2 (2.71)

2.67 (3.17)

2 (2.87)

2.67 (3.20)

2 (2.89)

Sex
Offense
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

3 (10.56)

5 (12.64)

3 (9.11)

5 (10.46)

3.67 (10.66)

Other
Violent
Crime
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

2 (4.58)

3 (5.53)

3 (6.35)

3 (4.85)

3 (5.23)

Other
Property
Crime
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

2 (2.25)

2 (2.52)

2 (2.23)

2 (2.60)

2 (2.33)

Other
Offense
Median
(Mean)
Sentence
Years

2 (2.56)

2 (2.85)

2 (2.54)

2 (2.90)

2 (2.65)
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Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on tenyear totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories based on
FBI definitions.
My conclusion is that sentence lengths are more or less uniform—
it is not the case that High Use and Low Use counties (or any
segment of the state, for that matter), impose remarkably divergent
median sentences from one another. The data is relatively uniform:
total new felon admission percentages by segment are roughly
comparable to total years sentenced by segment. That is, counties
send people and sentence them at roughly similar proportions of the
state total, although it should be noted that Low Use counties do
impose slightly longer mean sentences than High Use ones. This
could be due to lengthy sentences on the top end, or it could be
consistent with the observation in Table 9 (Offender Mix) that Low
Use counties use prison for more serious offenders.137 An initial cut,
removing just those prisoners sentenced to serve more than 100
years, does slightly narrow the gap between the two segments.138 One
conclusion I draw from this data is that, in some ways, sentencing
reform has worked—there is uniformity across the state, in that
offense X generally gets sentence Y. The issue, however, is that there
are few substantive limits on officials’ ability to charge offense X.
This might suggest that any future changes to statewide laws should
focus less on harmonizing the time associated with particular crimes
and more on harmonizing counties’ abilities to charge offenses. This
could be done by mandatory charging (harmonizing counties on a
higher level of incarceration), by reducing the number of substantive
offenses (harmonizing counties on a lower level of incarceration), or
some combination of the two. Realignment, discussed in Part V,
infra, tends toward the latter approach.
137. Note, for example, that High Use counties, which have greater percentages of “Other Violent”
offenders, have a median sentence length of a year less than anywhere else in the state.
138. New figures for NFA percentage are roughly unchanged (38.79, 19.19, 30.75, and 11.27 for
High, Low, Los Angeles, Middle, and State, respectively), while percentage of total sentence length
increases slightly for High Use and drops slightly for Low Use (34.75, 21.62, 31.97, and 11.65 percent
respectively).
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Ultimately, any differences in time sentenced might reflect real
differences in the crimes themselves. That is, some offenses might
get greater or lesser amounts of time because of qualitative
differences in the crimes themselves, not just policy decisions. I
speak not only of statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating
factors, but the heinousness of the offense.139 This is why, ultimately,
the comparison of offenses to one another must take place at a certain
level of generality and imprecision. Some differences in sentence
length might be because offenses are genuinely different from one
another, and some differences might be because counties (and their
policies) are genuinely different from one another. But in any given
case, it is nearly impossible to tell which dominates,140 which is why
this analysis has generally not focused on sentence lengths.
C. Recalculating State Coverage Rates by Segment
What would happen if other segments of the state began acting like
one another? I consider a variety of scenarios. First, I calculate what
would happen if the state coverage rate were replaced with the
coverage rate of each of the four segments. Even though the resulting
figures include only the first year of each new felon’s sentence, the
results would be dramatic, ranging from an additional cost of $879
million to a cut of more than half a billion dollars. Second, I calculate
what would happen if only individual segments of the state changed
their coverage rates. This analysis shows that changing just parts of
California could have profound fiscal impacts.

139. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 288–89 (2007) (holding that statutorily enumerated
factors must be charged and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). This governed California
sentencing in the later years of the study, although it is unclear what practical effect this might have had.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65 (“real offense discussion”). For a further exploration
of this issue, see Ball, supra note 41.
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Table 21: Subsidy Recalculated with Changed Statewide
Coverage Rate, by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 2000–
141
2009
High Use
Coverage

Low Use

Los Angeles

Middle Use

State Total

35.90%

14.60%

18.78%

27.58%

22.52%

State NFA if at
Segment
Coverage Rate

70,581

28,704

36,922

54,223

44,272

Excess NFA

26,309

-15,568

-7,350

9,951

N/A

$879.28

-$520.31

-$245.65

$332.58

N/A

Change in Cost
(millions)

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross
numbers per year. High and Low Subsidy values are for individual
counties within the respective groups.
One thing is immediately apparent from Table 21: the state cannot
afford for all counties to act like High Use counties. If the state
incarcerated at the High Use coverage rate, it would cost an
additional $879 million each year for just the first year of new felons’
sentences. The state would also have to find room in its already
overcrowded prisons to house an additional 26,309 incoming
prisoners each year. The state could, however, shed an average of
more than 15,000 inmates if it adopted Low Use coverage rates
statewide. In doing so, it would save more than $500 million in the
cost of the first year of new felons’ sentences.

141. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Statewide All Data”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4

84

Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not

2012]

TOUGH ON CRIME

1071

Table 22: Change in NFA with Changed Segment Coverage
142
Rate, by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 2000–2009
High Use

Low Use

Los Angeles

Rich Four

Poor Four

Segment
Changes to
High Use
Coverage
Rate

N/A

12, 127

12,662

355

287

Segment
Changes to
Low Use
Coverage
Rate

-10,104

N/A

-3,090

-3,114

-5,694

Segment
Changes to
Los Angeles
Coverage
Rate

-8,121

2,380

N/A

-2,433

-4,520

Segment
Changes to
Middle Use
Coverage
Rate

-3,948

7,390

6,509

-1,000

-2,049

Segment
Changes to
State
Average
Coverage
Rate

-6,347

4,509

2,767

-1,824

-3,470

Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross
numbers per year.

142. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Segment Coverage Change”).
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Even if the state were not to change as a whole, just changing a
segment of the state—or just the Rich and Poor Four—could have
significant impacts on prison space and prison budgets. If the High
Use counties changed their coverage rates to the state average, the
state would immediately save an average of more than 6,300 prison
beds in the first year alone (plus additional projected bed space in
following years for inmates serving multi-year sentences). If the Poor
Four counties alone changed to the state average, the state would
save an average of almost 3,500 prison beds. In fact, if the Poor Four
adopted the coverage rate of any of the other segments (besides that
of the High Use counties), the state would save millions of dollars
and thousands of prison beds. Alternatively, if the Low Use
counties—or just Los Angeles County—begin to emulate the High
Use counties, the state would face even more crowded prisons—more
than 24,000 prisoners each year (an effect that would be compounded
by sentences of more than one year).
With this diagnosis, what can California do to change coverage
rates and prison usage, or at least to account for them? The next
section sketches out some answers to that question.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
California faces many challenges relating to its overcrowded
prisons. Once we understand that California’s counties are different
when it comes to prison use, what are the policy implications? What
would happen if California’s policymakers understood that counties
are different—and that a county’s use of prison might be the result of
policy choices, not responses to crime? What effect would it have on
policies to promote prison population reductions? I examine three
possibilities: realignment, probation subsidies, and sentencing.
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A. Realignment, Prisoner Release
California must cut its prison population by approximately 37,000
inmates143 within the next two years144 or federal courts will order it
to release prisoners. Recently, the California Assembly passed
legislation to “realign” criminal justice, shifting more responsibilities
from the state to counties.145 As the state moves to redefine its
relationship to the counties, the county analysis in this Article might
be useful in blunting the criticism that the state is pushing its problem
onto the counties. With High Use counties, it might be argued that
the state is simply returning the problem to those counties. The state
has thus far given no indication that it will attempt to tailor
realignment to individual counties, but ideally, it would tailor its
responses to High and Low Use counties and demand more of the
former than the latter.
A second way this analysis might help is in the implementation of
realignment, particularly when it comes to setting benchmarks of
current versus desired prison usage. As I have stated, prison usage
per capita—whether total prison population or NFA—is too crude a
measure of prison need. Tying realignment benchmarks and/or
funding to current usage would merely lock in the existing subsidy,
rewarding (in perpetuity) counties which choose prison—and not
other options—as a response to crime. In some ways, in fact, tying
benchmarks for new reforms to existing prison usage is ironic: it
treats overcrowding by rewarding those counties most responsible for
it. Yet funding for the first nine months of realignment makes this
very mistake: Alameda is getting $9,219,946 of the realignment
budget, while San Bernardino is getting more than twice that
amount—$25,785,695—even though they have similar crime
problems.146 The only difference is that San Bernardino uses prison
143. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
144. Id. at 1945. The Supreme Court did, however, strongly hint that the three-judge panel should
extend the timeline if the state requests it. Id. at 1946–47.
145. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
146. These figures were disseminated by the Chief Probation Officers of California on their website.
CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL., AB 109 ALLOCATION REFINEMENTS (2011), available at
http://www.cpoc.org/php/realign/ab109fiscal/AB%20109%20Allocation%20Refinements%20for%2006
2411.xls. There is no clear information on exactly how these figures were calculated, and the long-term
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much more than Alameda. Using per capita prison usage does not
eliminate the prison subsidy, it merely shifts it to another part of the
ledger.
The state should, instead, tie realignment benchmarks to the
violent crime coverage rate. This would allow for flexibility in letting
counties imprison greater numbers in response to local outbreaks of
reported violent crime, while tying state subsidies for prison usage to
its most persuasive justification: crime.147 Violent crimes are readily
reported, and because higher crime rates are political poison, counties
have disincentives to game them. It is unlikely that localities would
risk the political discontent from rising crime rates in order to reserve
more prison resources for themselves.
Finally, one thing that has gotten lost in the realignment
discussion—and in this Article—is the relative size of the county and
state in criminal justice. Prison subsidies figures are sizeable, but
they are dwarfed by local criminal justice budgets. I added statewide
funding formula was deliberately left unresolved. See MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S
OFFICE, 2011 REALIGNMENT: ADDRESSING ISSUES TO PROMOTE ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS (2011),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/stadm/realignment/realignment_081911.pdf. For the
first nine months of AB 109, however, the amount counties received was calculated as follows: 60
percent of the total was given based on a county’s adult daily population in prison, 30 percent was based
on total population of adults (18–64) as a percentage of the state population, and 10 percent was based
on a county’s performance on SB 678, a bill which established performance-based funding for county
probation subsidies. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 2012-13, at 74 (2012),
available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (describing how
the county funding allocation involves three factors: “the estimates of the number of offenders who
would be under the jurisdiction of each county, each county’s population between the ages of 18 to 64,
and a county’s success under the felony probation program initiated under Chapter 608, Statues of 2009
(SB 678).”).
I note that Fresno and San Francisco Counties, among many others, present similar differences. During
the period of this study, Fresno County and San Francisco County had similar population sizes, and
even though San Francisco suffered from greater levels of violent crime, Fresno sent 2½ to 7 times as
many people to prison each year, and had between 2 and 3 times the number of people in prison.
Fresno’s initial realignment funding is $8,838,319; San Francisco County’s is $5,049,763. CHIEF PROB.
OFFICERS OF CAL., supra. Realignment is, of course, not the only area in which the state funds prison
population rather than prison need: a bill passed in May to reimburse counties for building local jail
facilities would “give funding preference to counties that committed the largest percentage of inmates to
state custody in relation to the total population of CDCR in 2010.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15820.917
(West 2011).
147. The state/local funding relationship in California is incredibly complex, however, due to a series
of ballot initiatives restricting the county’s ability to raise funds and the state’s ability to mandate
programs that would require county expenditures. See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, supra note 146, at 8–15
(noting the current restrictions and the difficulty of providing counties with flexible block grants).
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budget figures for local law enforcement (sheriffs and police), jail,
and probation to get an approximation of the amount of money spent
locally on criminal justice—though these figures in particular do not
include the budget for the county’s chief law enforcement official,
the District Attorney. I then added a county’s imputed gross prison
budget (total prison population times per capita prisoner cost) to
these budget figures. The result gives a total measure of county
criminal justice costs. Prisons are only one quarter of this total
amount. Counties have, on average, three times the criminal justice
resources available in-county that the state spends on its behalf for
imprisonment. Prisoners in state facilities are not the largest part of
county criminal justice. They never have been. I say this only to give
the financial concerns about realignment their proper context.
B. De-Subsidizing Prison, Re-Subsidizing Probation
The state could create two incentive mechanisms to encourage
High Use counties to lower their coverage rates—and to encourage
Low Use counties not to raise theirs. The first would be to decrease
the relative cost of in-county dispositions. The second would be to
increase the cost of prison usage.
Lowering the cost of in-county dispositions means expanding
financial support for diversion programs (such as those aimed at drug
abusers or the mentally ill), jail construction, and probation. As noted
earlier, jail bed numbers can increase without new construction if
counties relied less on bail and released more of the arraigned on
their own recognizance.148 The state could encourage this—or
mandate it—through, inter alia, changes to statutes or the uniform
bail schedule, by subsidizing the bail bond market, or subsidizing
electronic monitoring. The state could also subsidize probation, as,
indeed, it did until the mid-1970’s.149 The state would need to ensure
that subsidies kept pace with actual costs to the county, and it could
build political will by framing the costs to the state in terms of money
saved on prison usage. Any program must tie funding to measurable
148. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 63 (2008).
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outcomes to ensure that the programs actually reduce the strain on
the state’s prisons. Otherwise, the state will be spending money
without saving it.
The second option, charging counties for surplus prison usage, is
more policy neutral. Whereas probation subsidies might encourage
an uptake in the gross numbers of people in the criminal justice
system (or at least make it more affordable), charging for prison
usage would be more narrowly targeted at reducing unjustified use.
California actually used capitation fees in its successful drive to
decrease the state’s youth prison population.150 The state charged
counties per a rate schedule inverted with the seriousness of offense:
the state charged counties a lower day rate to house more serious
offenders and a higher day rate to house less serious offenders.151 The
capitation rate policy has not been tried with adult prison
populations, however.152
C. State Population Control and Determinate Sentencing
Although I have stated that prison overpopulation is largely a
county problem, and, accordingly, that statewide solutions generally
miss the mark, I nevertheless have one recommendation for
sentencing reform. The difference is that my suggestion is not on the
charging side, but on the release side. The state should explore the
reintroduction of indeterminate sentences—those sentences
terminating in a discretionary parole release decision—on a wider
basis as a means of prison population control. In an indeterminate
system, the state can release prisoners to parole at times of crowding;
determinate sentences means the state has no such leeway. In some
150. See, e.g., LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES
4 (2008), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/192/report192.pdf.
151. Id. There is some evidence, however, that counties have changed their charging practices and
have simply increased the number of adult criminal court filings in response. See, e.g., DANIEL
MACALLAIR ET AL., CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF REALIGNMENT ON
COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE PRACTICE: WILL CLOSING STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
INCREASE
ADULT
CRIMINAL
COURT
FILINGS?
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/The_impact_of_realignment_on_county_juvenile_justice_practice.pdf.
152. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 212 (describing a policy of “surcharg[ing]
units of local government for additional offenders referred to state prisons” but noting that “we know of
no American jurisdiction where this has been seriously proposed or considered”).
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ways, then, indeterminate sentencing systems allow the state to push
back on county decisions by controlling release decisions. In
determinate systems, the state has no such power.
California moved to determinate sentencing in 1975. Before then,
the state had some control when to release an offender, even though
it never controlled who was sent there. Now the state doesn’t have
any control. The only population variable is who goes to prison under
what charge, both of which are determined long before the state has
custody. There is a large amount of discretion with inputs to the
prison system—all of it at the county level or below—and none on
the state side with release. 153
Of course, I am well aware of the problems with some forms of
indeterminate sentencing, as I have demonstrated elsewhere.154 I
would not support the introduction of fully discretionary, unguided,
haphazard indeterminate sentencing. Instead, the state should go one
of two ways: set statewide standards on risk and enforce them
system-wide, or acknowledge the role of community differences and
break up the state system entirely. I have already written about the
former point;155 my next Article takes on the latter.156
***
California is one state; it is also fifty-eight counties. When it
comes to criminal justice and the state prison population, localities
are where the action is. County criminal justice budgets are much
larger than prison budgets, county officials make most of the key
decisions, and county responses to crime—not crime itself—drive
new felon admission rates. Alameda and San Bernardino are very
similar when it comes to criminal justice except in their usage of
prison. It is hard to understand why the tax revenues from Alameda’s
153. Id. at 212 (“Eliminating or reducing the power of parole boards over the release of prisoners
removed a significant means of controlling prison population from that level of government responsible
for the cost of the prison system.”).
154. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 63 (describing California’s current parole release system as “less a
form of parole release than a form of parole retention”). See also W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious,
and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COL. L. REV. 893
(2009).
155. See Ball, supra note 63.
156. See Ball, supra note 41.
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residents should go towards paying for San Bernardino’s choices. I
am not suggesting that the case cannot be made; I am, however,
saying that on the basis of crime, the case has not been made.157
I want to emphasize, again, that this study is subject to several
limitations. Measuring prison usage in terms of violent crime is a
choice I made in designing the study, not a result of it. I have no
smoking gun evidence that prison usage is a policy choice; I have
only evidence that higher prison usage is not the result of higher
crime. Ultimately, the conclusion of this study is that counties are
different. The difficult question that remains is which of those
differences the state should subsidize, if any.

157. Perhaps Alameda receives a greater share of other state resources that evens out with San
Bernardino’s greater share of prison resources.
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GLOSSARY
APAR—Adult Population at Risk. The subset of a county
population between the ages of 18 and 69.
Coverage—NFA as a percentage of violent crime. This is a proxy
variable for the degree to which a county responds to crime with
incarceration.
High Use—Counties with annual coverage rates and/or NFA
surplus in the top quartile for at least 7 of the 10 years of the study.
High Five—The subset of low coverage/NFA deficit counties with
relatively high per capita incomes: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,
San Francisco, and Santa Cruz
Low Six—The subset of low coverage/NFA deficit counties with
relatively low per capita incomes: Imperial, Nevada, Sacramento,
San Joaquin, Sonoma, and Stanislaus.
Low Use—Counties with annual coverage rates and/or NFA
deficits in the bottom quartile for at least 7 of the 10 years of the
study.
NFA—new felon admissions, prisoners entering prison upon
conviction or plea of a new felony charge. Distinguished from other
entrants to the prison system, such as those who have had their parole
revoked or parolees admitted with a new term (as a result of a new
crime).
Poor Four—The four high-NFA-surplus counties with belowaverage per capita incomes: Fresno, Kern, Riverside, and San
Bernardino.
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Rich Four—The four high-NFA-surplus counties with aboveaverage per capita incomes: Orange, Placer, Santa Barbara, and Santa
Clara.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF COUNTY SEGMENTS
High Use
High Coverage
Colusa
Glenn
Inyo
Lake
Lassen
Trinity

Low Use
Low Coverage
Alpine
San Benito

High NFA Surplus Both
Fresno
Butte
Kern
Kings
Orange
Shasta
Placer
Sutter
Riverside
San Bernardino
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara

NFA Deficit
(Los Angeles)
San Diego

Both
Alameda
Contra Costa
Imperial
Marin
Nevada
Sacramento
San Francisco
San Joaquin
Santa Cruz
Sonoma
Stanislaus

Middle Use
Amador, Calaveras, Del Norte, El Dorado, Humboldt, Madera,
Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa,
Plumas, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano,
Tehama, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, Yuba.
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF COUNTY SEGMENTS

Low Use counties
Middle Use Counties
High Use counties
Los Angeles County
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